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by ppod
2935 days ago
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> I am interested in the notion or aspect of consciousness that relates to why people behave the way they do, think the way they think, and are not only largely oblivious to it (the idea of examining behavior and the ~motivations behind it) but commonly hostile to it, sometimes extremely so. Or even more interestingly, the ability to easily notice the behavior in others, but utterly incapable of seeing the same thing in oneself. I completely agree that this is maybe the most interesting general field of inquiry out there, I just think that the consciousness literature/debate has almost nothing of interest to say on it. I think the fields of interest are evolutionary psychology, neurobiology, and at a higher level the interface between sociology and behavioural psychology. >a terrible analogy might be how humans can see one segment of the light spectrum, while other mammals can see others, and machines can see more I like analogies like this and am totally on board with you here. But again, things like 'Mary's Room' are not at all interesting or detailed addresses to this when we know so much about how brains and bodies and artificial neural networks can hold and use so many kinds of knowledge at different levels. You're getting kind of towards Penrose territory at the end there with suggesting that there could be senses or phenomenologies that we currently know nothing of the mechanisms of. I agree that this is true in principle but I think that the evidence that we have from biology and from artificial intelligence suggests that we could probably explain all of our abilities just with physical properties that we already understand. I wouldn't rule out some quantum component though. I think that it's likely the problem is one of scale and complexity rather than a qualitatively new kind of process. The brain is not only huge but is designed by a messy ad-hoc evolutionary process that is hostile to interpretation by our own reflexive symbolic investigation, and I'd say that's where the difficulty lies. I completely agree with your line of thinking though. |
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Mary's Room demonstrates that's there's more to knowing the world than just third person descriptions. There's also experience.
Whether you want to call experience a form of knowledge, or something else like an ability is the crux of whether that particular argument works or not, since it's based on whether knowing all the physical facts leaves some knowledge out (experiential).
But I think it works to show that our physical theories of the world can't capture our experience of the world, because one is abstract and mathematical, and the other is how we perceive and feel. So nothing about biology, physics or ANNs bridges that gap, I don't think, since they're expressed in third person terminology. That's the hard problem.