[verelo]

Nor does TD. They don't even do phone notifications of logins.

Ironically i signed up with one of the local credit unions in Toronto to take advantage of a high interest savings account for a future tax debt of which I am sitting on the cash for, and found they supported SMS 2FA, and texts when anyone (even me) logged into the account. I wish TD supported this, but then again, as long as their money is backed by the government i don't really care all that much.

[kevin_nisbet]

Actually I think TD just launched a SMS based two factor, I set it up on the weekend (I got prompted when I logged into EasyWeb, and it's also in my security settings). It's SMS based, and can be configured on how aggressive it is (when you change IP/computer, or every time you log in).

I would much prefer to see a second factor like TOTP, U2F, etc as the problems with SMS based second factor are well documented, but I'll take what I can get.

[ar0]

Even TOTP is not a good 2fa system for a bank login, at least if that account allows you to send money somewhere: TOTP codes do not differentiate by transaction type, so if a fraudster has taken over your computer, it can wait for you to login using TOTP and then send a wire transfer in the background (using the same TOTP quickly enough if necessary or just asking you to log in again, pretending your first code was wrong).

That’s why proper banks should use 2FA mechanisms that will ask the user to confirm the transaction on a second device (e.g. photoTAN or similar).

Of course, this won’t help against attacks if both devices are compromised or you are using the second factor device to access the system, but it’s still better than TOTP.

And, of course, TOTP is still way better than SMS 2FA or no 2FA.

[_hl_]

If someone has hijacked your computer, they could simply steal your session cookie and do whatever they want regardless of some TOTP secrets or being quick enough. In fact at that point any 2FA becomes meaningless - it's already game over.

Unless of course your bank does some proper, additional verification for large volume transfers.

[ar0]

Of course, that‘s the point: with photoTAN et al. it will request a one-time token for each wire transfer, and the token is based on the information (amount and recipient) of the transfer, which the user needs to confirm on its 2FA device.

[verelo]

Correct! Thanks for posting this, i just enabled it.

For anyone who wants to set it up you can find it by...

1) Logging into Easy Web

2) Click your name in the top right

3) "Password and security"

[ahelwer]

SMS-based 2FA is less secure than just a password. You unfortunately decreased the security of your account :(

[kevin_nisbet]

Can you elaborate?

I'm not sure I understand why you believe SMS codes as a second factor compromise the security of the password authentication.

[derefr]

It’s very easy to socially engineer a cellular ISP into redirecting arbitrary customers’ calls/texts to you, with just publically-available information.

[A2017U1]

That only matters if account reset is done through SMS. Barring that it is another layer of protection albeit weaker than TOTP.

[Rafert]

How is requiring a SMS token in addition to a password less secure than just requiring the password?

[ahelwer]

Because SMS is used in password-recovery workflows, meaning it isn't a second factor at all - it's a single, easily-breakable factor.

[jeromegv]

Except your bank already has your phone number. If phone was already part of the recovery process, it didn’t make it any less safe by enabling 2FA SMS

[kevin_nisbet]

This only happens if SMS get's used in the password-recovery workflow. I don't think there is evidence that TD is using SMS to replace password reset.

So I really don't see how this makes security worse.

[verelo]

Maybe, that depends on the implementation. I don't believe they allow password resets from Easyweb via SMS, so i believe in this case it's at worst "as good as it was before", and only when they've managed to hijack my phone number.

[soperj]

TD is actually terrible. If you forget your password and you can answer one of the questions about the person (Ie: what was your high school mascot?) they actually just let you change the password at that point.

[Pxtl]

Hah, I remember when TD actually started supporting proper password lengths and published a bunch of fluff pieces about good password practices, as if none of their users remember their old short password restrictions.

[mabbo]

> one of the local credit unions in Toronto

Got a name? And do you recommend them? Long-time RBC customer, which means they treat me terribly. Mortgage is coming up for renewal soon enough.

[verelo]

I signed up for both Meridian and EQ bank. Both supported various 2FA options. I only used them as a higher interest savings account (One was 1.5% the other was 2%, so yeah, low but not terrible - I've since moved that tax liability to Wealthsimple's high interest account), cannot really vouch for their service outside of saying they gave me the interest and the initial capital back without any drama.

[ams6110]

SMS as a 2FA has been discredited, but I suppose it's better than nothing.

[ahelwer]

Nope, it's worse. Websites will use it as an authentication method in password-reset workflows, which means hacking your account reduces to intercepting or redirecting text messages (easily accomplished). Rampant cryptocurrency theft over the past year has conclusively demonstrated that SMS-based 2FA is worse than no 2FA at all. The worst offender? Gmail. It uses your phone number for password recovery and is in turn used for password recovery by every other website.

[lotsofpulp]

Gmail allows you to use SMS, but does not force you to and gives you other secure options.

[ahelwer]

That's true, but I single it out because:

1) Many people have had their Gmail account for a long time, starting before SMS-based 2FA was widely known as a security disaster (this is in fact still not widely-known)

2) Google still actively encourages users to add a recovery phone number

3) Users could have added a phone number years ago then forgotten (this was the case with myself)

4) Users often have many websites using their Gmail account for password-reset workflows (this is definitely the case with myself)

All of these combine to make Gmail the ideal hacker entrypoint. See this hack: https://www.reddit.com/r/ethtrader/comments/8klw4f/someone_j...

[gruez]

>2) Google still actively encourages users to add a recovery phone number

i would consider the average person to be pretty bad at handling otp backups. how else would you do recovery?

[ahelwer]

You are correct this is a significant usability issue. Personally I use Authy, which performs automatic encrypted backups in case I lose my phone. I then have to remember my Authy recovery password (not stored in my password manager, which is itself secured with a TOTP - hello circular dependency danger!) I also keep a yubikey authorized with all my accounts as second backup.

All these things are beyond what the average person wants to worry about, as you say, but HN readers will find it simple. Personally I'm hoping U2F (Yubikeys) are the future, since your average person certainly understands the concept of a key.