| Let's remember that their attackers include the most sophisticated in the world, such as state intelligence agencies, sophisticated criminal organizations, corporate intelligence, and others. Just keep the air gap; anyone using this software can afford an extra computer. Put the two machines next to each other; duct tape them together if you want, or put two USB hubs on your desk - pull USB drive out of slot A, put it in slot B. And put the USB stick shredder directly beneath slot B. Not hard for the user: 1-2-3. Even more importantly, it's critical that they communicate accurate information, in an unmistakable way, about the level of security they provide. Statements like these are troubling: > Based on the threat model analysis, we will perform additional hardening of the prototype. This implies they can actually protect their users against the attackers, which is not reasonable. > Thanks to the work of developer Joshua Thayer There is no way that one developer can possibly, in a lifetime, provide adequate security. You can't do it on the cheap. Joshua is facing multiple attackers with budgets in the millions and billions and with teams of hundreds or more specialists. He has my sympathies; will he get the blame when it fails? |
Furthermore, your thread model is exaggerated. Yes, "they" have giant budgets. No, "they" won't call in the cavallery in most cases because most cases are simply not important enough to justify expenses beyond "an intern clicks through the existing tools".
Finally, if you want real security, do as a farmer(!) friend of mine says: Leave all electronics at home and go for a long walk with your source.