[graeme]

I haven't actually read Brodie, I'm just going on my memory from my strategic studies class. But my recollection is that he more or less fully fleshed out nuclear warfare theory in 1946. The tech wasn't there, but the logic of the weapons was.

MAD is less a strategy than a reality. As long as each side has weapons that can't be credibly destroyed in a first strike, you have MAD, whether theorists explicitly call for it or not.

Though of course submarines make this easier to achieve in practice.

I might be wrong about this though, perhaps there were significant differences between Brodie's 1946 theory and later MAD developments.

[forapurpose]

Thanks. A couple things I don't think are accurate, based on my limited knowledge:

> As long as each side has weapons that can't be credibly destroyed in a first strike, you have MAD

With the significant qualifier that you need enough weapons to survive to completely destroy the enemy.

> MAD is less a strategy than a reality

I'm pretty sure that's incorrect. It was and is a specific strategy and implementing it was the reason for the ABM treaty and others - defensive weapons would make destruction less "assured". See the source I linked above.

[graeme]

The thing with defense is that even without the ABM treaty, we don't have an effective defense. MIRVs will always be cheaper than single shot ABMs, and their reliability is too low to rely on in the event of a second strike. That's what I meant by it being a reality.

People do of course adopt it as a strategy as well. But if effective defense tech existed I don't think the strategy would hold. The US abandoned the ABM treaty even without such technology.

As for your first point, it's true that MAD didn't really conclusively come into force until submarines. But there were efforts before then to maintain a second strike capability, such as keeping a certain percentage of bombers in the air, preparing them for fast takeoff, etc

Maybe not 100% assured second strike, but the basic idea was the same