[lihes]

man urandom

> When read during early boot time, /dev/urandom may return data prior to the entropy pool being initialized.

I see no bugs here. Just repeating what is written in the man page.

[oconnor663]

If you continue to the next sentence in that man page:

> If this is of concern in your application, use getrandom(2) or /dev/random instead.

These bugs affect getrandom too.

[lihes]

Where is it written? Could you pin point it? I see urandom everywhere.

[oconnor663]

I got it from this part, unless I'm misreading:

> Multiple callers, including sys_getrandom(..., flags=0), attempt to wait for the

> RNG to become cryptographically safe before reading from it by checking for

> crng_ready() and waiting if necessary. However, crng_ready() only checks for

> `crng_init > 0`, and `crng_init==1` does not imply that the RNG is

> cryptographically safe.

[jwilk]

Please don't post shallow dismissals.

None of the reported bugs are about /dev/urandom returning data too early.

[anon1385]

Keep in mind that a lot of high profile security people on HN and elsewhere have spent many years now telling everybody that the linux urandom man page is wrong, so don't be surprised when people ignore it.

https://hn.algolia.com/?query=urandom%20manpage&sort=byPopul...