[peterwwillis]

It doesn't matter how many DNS resolvers you have. If you can spoof BGP, and use it to spoof the DNS resolvers, and the authoritative name server, you can stand up your own DNS that says anything you want it to say.

The only thing you cannot do is fake out DNSSEC. If you use a TLD which supports DNSSEC, you can make sure records have to be signed with your key. If fake DNS records aren't signed with your key, and the CA uses a validating stub resolver, and the CA is checking for CAA records, they will reject the attempt to create the cert. In theory.

Here's the thing. The CAs know about these flaws and are still not providing more secure ways to prevent these attacks. How could it be more secure? The domain registrar could accept a public key from you at the time of purchase. At that point, nobody should ever be allowed to generate a cert anywhere without you signing off on it with your key. Is this some magically impossible technical challenge which mere mortals can't comprehend? Hell no. They literally just need to write an ASCII file in a database next to your domain name. But we aren't demanding it of them, so they aren't doing it. So attacks like this leave everyone vulnerable, because nobody cares enough to fix it.

[cjbprime]

And if you lose the key, as thousands of people would every day at a large registrar?

[peterwwillis]

Use the same method you use to pay for the domain to reset the key. This would require logging into your account at the registrar, or contacting support and providing enough verifiable material to reset it.

If the registrar signed a message that had your key in it, they could re-sign it with a replacement key. So now you can 1) verify who originally assigned the domain, 2) record the public key, and 3) see a verifiable history of changes as long as the old history is included in successive signing. This could be used as part of a public record ala Certificate Transparency, or a blockchain-style system. If the attacker spoofs BGP and SE's your registrar, you (or whomever) can see if anyone creates a new key.