[epsilon_machine]

What about browser fingerprinting (https://panopticlick.eff.org/)? Unless you are using the Tor browser, this appears "uncontainable" especially for folks not using Chrome over Windows 10 or another super generic combination.

[vidyesh]

Blocking your canvas to avoid being fingerprinted/tracked is like walking under the CCTV with a hoodie and cap on. Unless everyone under the CCTV does the same you will not be detected but will be tracked. It might be hard to identify you but you will standout.

So instead of standing out of the crowd why not disguise so well that the tracker doesn't know the real you.

The idea is to use something that gives a fake readout of your fingerprint thus making you look normal but keep changing it occasionally so it leads no where for long time. Try Canvas blocker[1] and/or Canvas Defender for fake readout.

[1]https://github.com/kkapsner/CanvasBlocker

[afx]

> The idea is to use something that gives a fake readout of your fingerprint thus making you look normal but keep changing it occasionally so it leads no where for long time.

What is "normal" in this case? One correct way to counter fingerprinting is to standardize the fake readouts to a specific value and not change it every so often. So if everyone's browser is reporting the same value for this feature that feature will become meaningless in the context of fingerprinting since its entropy is very low.

That's what Tor Browser has been doing with font enumeration, reported windows size, screen resolution etc. - they all report the same value. On the other hand, you can correlate these values and identify Tor Browser users.