| zero knowledge proofs fail to address this concern: > all you have to do is to set up a fake website advertising "Look up if your vote is counted as it should be", let people type in their credentials, and you now know exactly how millions of people have voted. this is a social engineering problem, not a cryptography problem. said social engineering would be much harder to implement with paper ballots than a system that's available over the internet. further, your reply does not address this concern: > That you cannot "look up your vote" later is not a bug: it's a feature. i should not be able to verifiably let another party know how i voted. to use your own rhetorical device, i'd suggest you look up vote selling and voter coercion. >>>> Paper ballots with automated scanners is a solved problem. It works, it's cheap, and it's virtually tamper-proof. (Tampering with the result will require physical access by many people: if you allow that possibility you're basically conceding that you cannot trust the government to run the election properly, and using any technology won't save you.) >>>> In other words, paper ballots is a boring, unsexy technology whose only benefit is that it works. No wonder people aren't excited. > Blockchain is the only legitimate way to carry out voting, imo. you'll have to forgive me if i'm still unconvinced. |