|
One of the strategies is to keep Taiwan itself armed. Civilians like us can't know this, but it has been hypothesized that one of the levers being used on China with regard to North Korea's development of nuclear weapons is explaining to them that if North Korea goes nuclear, they can expect Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, and who knows who else to go nuclear, either via local development of the weaponry or via assisted development from the US, if not outright turning weapons over. After all, one imagines that if they really put their mind to it, Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea could all go nuclear in a period measured in small single-digit months. They really aren't that hard [1]. If, indeed, they aren't already effectively nuclear. (We'd probably know if they'd ever tested a weapon. We wouldn't necessarily know if they'd actually built one. If I were them, I totally would have.) One of the interesting aspects of the whole Inevitable Rise of China narrative storyline is that it has been predicated on their continuing to develop and primarily use soft power. I tend to agree if they focused on that, they have many avenues available for major growth, if not outright exceeding the US in power, certainly by the end of the 21st century. The equations for all of that have to be reconsidered from scratch if they become a dictatorship, become subject to the whims of a single man, and decide to primarily pursue hard power. If they become outright aggressively belligerent, they are surrounded by countries powerful enough to at least put a dent in their ambitions in Taiwan, Japan, Korea, and India, all of whom are already generally US allies and would be chased into the US's arms fully by a belligerent China. China is not currently powerful enough to take on that coalition, nor is it clear to me where they would get allies for that push. (It seems unlikely that the EU would full-throatedly throw in their lot with China. Russia, other than being nuclear, isn't really a strong enough military or economic power against that sort of coalition to be the deciding factor.) Furthermore, China's internal power is IMHO more delicate than may meet the eye; if China devotes more resources into hard power internally and the middle class starts to fade, internal social unrest is going to be a major problem. Even if China manages to suppress its most overt expressions, unrest still manifests itself in many little ways. The best move for China is slow and steady, to win the race. But if one man decides that's not fast enough, well, a lot of people could end up dying for that decision and my guess is China would still not come out on top. [1]: https://io9.gizmodo.com/this-experiment-proved-that-anyone-c... |
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_nuclear_weapon_progra...:
> While there are currently no known plans in Japan to produce nuclear weapons, it has been argued Japan has the technology, raw materials, and the capital to produce nuclear weapons within one year if necessary, and many analysts consider it a de facto nuclear state for this reason...
> Japan has also developed the M-V three-stage solid-fuel rocket, somewhat similar in design to the U.S. LGM-118A Peacekeeper ICBM, giving it a missile technology base. It now has an easier-to-launch second generation solid-fuel rocket, Epsilon. Japan has experience in re-entry vehicle technology...
> In 2011, former Minister of Defense Shigeru Ishiba explicitly backed the idea of Japan maintaining the capability of nuclear latency: "I don't think Japan needs to possess nuclear weapons, but it's important to maintain our commercial reactors because it would allow us to produce a nuclear warhead in a short amount of time ... It's a tacit nuclear deterrent"