[yorwba]

The difficult part is the "in a way that cannot be faked". If you can record it using a device you control, you can generate a fake made to appear as if it had been recorded with that device. If you do not fully control the recording device (say because it uses a secure enclave to generate signatures), you'll need some way to generate realistic inputs for fake data, but that might be as easy as photographing a high-resolution print.

If the effort to document the truthfulness of data is much higher than for unverified recordings, the majority of the evidence anyone can come up with will be of the variety that is trivially to fake for someone determined.

[gmueckl]

Tamper-proof HSMs in recording equipment might do the trick. The point is not that they can be broken. The level of sophistication has to be high enough that most bad actors will be incapable of doing that. This is why chip cards for security work.