Related: How the Chinese Government Fabricates Social Media Posts for Strategic Distraction, not Engaged Argument (PDF)
>The Chinese government has long been suspected of hiring as many as 2,000,000 people to surreptitiously insert huge numbers of pseudonymous and other deceptive writings into the stream of real social media posts, as if they were the genuine opinions of ordinary people. Many academics, and most journalists and activists, claim that these so-called “50c party” posts vociferously argue for the government’s side in political and policy debates. As we show, this is also true of the vast majority of posts openly accused on social media of being 50c. Yet, almost no systematic empirical evidence exists for this claim, or, more importantly, for the Chinese regime’s strategic objective in pursuing this activity. In the first large scale empirical analysis of this operation, we show how to identify the secretive authors of these posts, the posts written by them, and their content. We estimate that the government fabricates and posts about 448 million social media comments a year. In contrast to prior claims, we show that the Chinese regime’s strategy is to avoid arguing with skeptics of the party and the government, and to not even discuss controversial issues. We show that the goal of this massive secretive operation is instead to distract the public and change the subject, as most of the these posts involve cheerleading for China, the revolutionary history of the Communist Party, or other symbols of the regime. We discuss how these results fit with what is known about the Chinese censorship program, and suggest how they may change our broader theoretical understanding of “common knowledge” and information control in authoritarian regimes.
I have always assumed as much. Like the chaff that defensive systems on a fighter plane has. Shoot out a bunch of garbage to confuse the highly targeted offensive action.
Not surprising at all. In fact, many of the Chinese expats (visitors of mitbbs.com) are pro-china in general. They become less agreeing to western values after spending years in US. (I am one of those examples myself)
I'm an American, I've had many close Chinese friends. What follows is completely anecdotal, but I've spent a lot of time trying to wrap my mind around it, for what it is worth.
Our cultures are incredibly different. At the same time our cultures are both unusually strong. And for some reason, part of American culture seems to be assuming everyone in the world is just like us, just in different circumstances. This is extremely foolish.
It took me quite a while to be able to understand some things about my Chinese friends that really confused and sometimes frustrated me. A big part of it is the American concept of freedom and personal independence is practically part of our DNA, while it is not valued very highly by many Chinese. Stability, peace and order are highly valued. Of course it would be nice to be able to do whatever you want, but it is much more important that the government is strong. Period. And you get away with what you can as an individual (I've noticed much less respect for the rule of law, much greater respect for personal relationships). And of course many (not all) are highly patriotic, as a great culture with a great history that has been under great pressure for generations, and feels that the rest of the world doesn't respect them like they should or wants to see them fail.
I guess I'd sum it up, that it seems to me an unusual amount of mainland Chinese would choose strength over freedom, and almost all mainland Chinese see themselves as part of a bigger society and a somewhat oppressive government is inevitable and it is futile to resist.
In America, we would prefer to free 10 guilty people than unjustly imprison 1 innocent person. In China, the concept is reversed, it is better to imprison 10 innocent people than let 1 guilty person go free. I actually heard someone say that. Think about it.
So if this is true and the majority of Chinese people don’t have freedom as a basic value then there is no reason to opress it. If they truly believed in the values and ideas you expressed there is no reason to opress free speech or am I missing something? (Genuine question)
This is a good question. Perhaps it is as simple as this is the leadership culture in China. Their great leaders are firm, are tough, do not tolerate dissent. And maybe people respect them for it.
"I don't know" is the real answer, but here is my guess.
My Chinese friends are incredibly social, incredibly loyal (to each other), trustworthy (to each other) to a fault. They may be ready to submit to an irresistible power, but if they feel they could resist, and somehow benefit their group, they might resist. They love China, they know a strong government is a necessity, they might not particularly care who that government is run by, and might be happy to help replace one dictator with another.
I think the social nature of the culture is the key here. Americans often try to stand out and be independent. Chinese seem to see themselves as part of a group, and they are very good at self-organizing even large groups of people. While the government is in power, that is their government. If it seems like the tide of the opinion of your group is we need a new government, maybe they'll take the streets en masse (like tiananmen square). So maybe the culture means that 99% of the time everyone is peaceful and cooperative, and then that 1% of the time everyone is in the streets burning down the governors house. I don't think anyone would enjoy mob rule, so maybe even the mob would tend to replace a strong ruler with another strong ruler.
These are just my thoughts based on the people I know.
But I think the Chinese government has always lived in fear of the mob. Their biggest threat has never been an outside power, but their own people. There are an incredible number of people living in a small area. This explains the one-child policy in my mind, too many people == not enough food == mobs in the street. So, perhaps as simply self-preservation, the government has 1) limited their population 2) ensured constant economic growth 3) limited the ability for a mob to form at all by controlling communication 4) tried to instill national pride and patriotism whenever possible.
You raise an incredibly interesting point here. "The biggest threat is their own people." Scams are so prevalent here I often think that what looks like 1984 style policies and procedures is seen in their eyes as a form of protection. To the outside world it is draconian. To them they are trying to protect from internal marauders.
This. At least in my family most of my older Chinese relatives prefer order and peace to American democracy, for their income increased dramatically over the past 5 years. But I guess after family income gets to certain threshold, people will start weighting more on freedom.
But if you get to any Chinese over 60, they still remember the chaotic cultural revolution very clearly, they definitely don’t want a return to strongman cult of personality Maoism where Xi seems to be going.
Xi is the last vestige of Maoism, the last president who grew up under Mao’s shadow. The next generation of leadership is surely going to be much more modern than any before it. That they are delaying it for something in china’s past is a travesty.
> But if you get to any Chinese over 60, they still remember the chaotic cultural revolution very clearly, they definitely don’t want a return to strongman cult of personality Maoism where Xi seems to be going.
It's interesting that to note that Xi Jinping is from that exact same generation, and both he and his family were persecuted during the Cultural Revolution:
> When the pandemonium of the Cultural Revolution erupted, he was a slight, softly spoken 13-year-old who loved classical Chinese poetry. Two years later, adrift in a city torn apart by warring Red Guards, Xi Jinping had hardened into a combative street survivor.
> His father, a senior Communist Party official who had been purged a few years earlier, was seized and repeatedly beaten. Student militants ransacked his family’s home, forcing the family to flee, and one of his sisters died in the mayhem. Paraded before a crowd as an enemy of the revolution and denounced by his own mother, the future president of China was on the edge of being thrown into a prison for delinquent children of the party elite.
> ...
> Unlike some youths from elite backgrounds, Mr. Xi did not turn against the party or Mao, but learned to revere strict order and abhor challenges to hierarchy, said Yongyi Song, a historian and librarian in Los Angeles who has long studied the Cultural Revolution.
> “He suffered much under Mao,” Mr. Song said, “but I think that actually increased his belief that those who are ‘born red,’ those children of the party elite, earned the right to inherit Mao’s place at the center.”
> Xi is the last vestige of Maoism, the last president who grew up under Mao’s shadow. The next generation of leadership is surely going to be much more modern than any before it.
Experts were saying that China was slowly but steadily marching on the path to liberalization, but now we have Xi and that that doesn't seem to be the case anymore. I fear those predictions, like yours, are fallacious and overoptimistic.
Not sure how to explain this best, but let's just say cultural revolution's most devastating impact was on culture. If you ask any elderly with good upbringing, you'll probably hear the answers you expect, but I'm from a working class family, and the only bad thing my relatives experienced was unable to go to college.
While I appreciate your perspective, and I am not disagreeing, I recently took a survey amount young SH professionals asking about their life paths. Should they do what others (defined broadly) wish them to do for work and/or life or should they seek out what makes them happy and they are skilled and interested in? Overwhelmingly for the latter which surprised me. The educated younger generation is skewed more towards Western ideals I believe. You can't have the extreme western materialism without getting the personal aspirations not to be controlled.
Alot of the opposite is true. Alot of the Chinese old timers remember the brutality they suffered under Mao and are very upset at this current event. Many of them want to sell their factories and move the money to HK (and eventually out of China).
It'll take too much time to talk in details. Democracy in general in better than totalitarian in general, i don't disagree with that. However, establishing American democracy in China at this moment, most likely won't bring anything good or solve any problems China is facing now. And it's dangerous: If a presidential candidate say "Elect me and we'll take Taiwan back by force", the most likely outcome is that he'll get a shit ton of votes for that stance.
>The Chinese government has long been suspected of hiring as many as 2,000,000 people to surreptitiously insert huge numbers of pseudonymous and other deceptive writings into the stream of real social media posts, as if they were the genuine opinions of ordinary people. Many academics, and most journalists and activists, claim that these so-called “50c party” posts vociferously argue for the government’s side in political and policy debates. As we show, this is also true of the vast majority of posts openly accused on social media of being 50c. Yet, almost no systematic empirical evidence exists for this claim, or, more importantly, for the Chinese regime’s strategic objective in pursuing this activity. In the first large scale empirical analysis of this operation, we show how to identify the secretive authors of these posts, the posts written by them, and their content. We estimate that the government fabricates and posts about 448 million social media comments a year. In contrast to prior claims, we show that the Chinese regime’s strategy is to avoid arguing with skeptics of the party and the government, and to not even discuss controversial issues. We show that the goal of this massive secretive operation is instead to distract the public and change the subject, as most of the these posts involve cheerleading for China, the revolutionary history of the Communist Party, or other symbols of the regime. We discuss how these results fit with what is known about the Chinese censorship program, and suggest how they may change our broader theoretical understanding of “common knowledge” and information control in authoritarian regimes.
http://gking.harvard.edu/files/gking/files/50c.pdf