[hprotagonist]

Such a concept practically does away with the very basis of the ancient differentiation of people into classes according to the kind of work done. This does not mean that, from the objective point of view, human work cannot and must not be rated and qualified in any way.

It only means that the primary basis of the value of work __is man himself, who is its subject__. This leads immediately to a very important conclusion of an ethical nature: however true it may be that man is destined for work and called to it, __in the first place work is "for man" and not man "for work"__.

Through this conclusion one rightly comes to recognize the pre-eminence of the subjective meaning of work over the objective one. Given this way of understanding things, and presupposing that different sorts of work that people do can have greater or lesser objective value, let us try nevertheless to show that __each sort is judged above all by the measure of the dignity of the subject of work, that is to say the person, the individual who carries it out.__

On the other hand: independently of the work that every man does, and presupposing that this work constitutes a purpose—at times a very demanding one—of his activity, this purpose does not possess a definitive meaning in itself. In fact, in the final analysis it is always man who is the purpose of the work, whatever work it is that is done by man—even if the common scale of values rates it as the merest "service", as the most monotonous even the most alienating work.

Laborem exercens, 1982