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by vvanders 3052 days ago
Except that tractors are more dangerous than your car/appliance/whatever.

You'd be amazed the amount of carnage running a brushhog at 1000rpm will do when it was designed at 540rpm. They will happily throw the 3-4 foot blade right though 1/2in steel up to 300-400ft in whatever direction the wind takes them.

When that process is controlled by software all it takes is flipping the wrong high order bit in the PTO controller. On a manual tractor it's very clear when the PTO lever is in 1000rpm vs 540rpm(and usually on a separate lever from engagement) vs an opaque software stack.

2 comments

Safety is exactly one of the reasons why you'd want the complexity of software laid bare out in the open, rather than hidden as a black box of unknown size! Your own comment laments the clarity of two entire levers to control PTO versus an "opaque software stack" - why is it a forgone conclusion that that stack must be opaque?!

To address another objection of yours about unknown modifications, this too is an aspect where openness buttresses safety. Rather than blindly trusting that the software has not been modified (because such methods are unknown to you), the proper way to verify integrity is by being able to compare checksums or reflash, knowing there is no hidden state.

"Safety is exactly one of the reasons why you'd want the complexity of software laid bare out in the open"

No, disagree. If I laid out our source code for you, there is no way you would have any way to understand it without all the internal documentation from which the software was architected and developed from. Non computer people always have this misconception that if they see the code, they see everything it's doing. To a degree you can see what code is doing but understanding why certain logic exists is not always clear without supporting documentations.

Additionally, some of our code is 3rd party licensed and that adds an entire new wrinkle to things.

For an over simplified example, our CAN buses have thousands of signals. A single CAN frame may have 20 to 30 internal signals and several signals across many CAN buses are examined to make decisions and I've only scratched the surface here. There is no amount of code study you can do to understand this without some coaching or review of associated internal specifications.

For me or any company to support someone's quest to understand the code would be a very costly endeavor that you're simply not entitled too or nor would it be a reasonable request.

> If I laid out our source code for you, there is no way you would have any way to understand it without all the internal documentation from which the software was architected and developed from. Non computer people always have this misconception that if they see the code, they see everything it's doing

This isn't a forum for "non computer people" - I've been a professional embedded developer, hardware and software.

This stance is wrong and terrifying. The code, safety critical code especially, should be clear and should itself document the quirks of whatever it interacts with. Embedded has a culture of punting on abstractions due to the pervasiveness of cross cutting and global concerns (peripheral allocation, interrupt usage, tight latencies, etc), coupled with traditionally smaller code sizes. But we're no longer talking about devices with little memory or cycle by cycle timing, but 32-bit devices with dynamic allocation performing high level logical processing. The embedded culture of fiddling with stateful hacks, verification primarily through system-level testing, and then zipping up the source tree for revision control needs to be burnt at the stake. Leave the bit banging to single-purpose 8 bit micros at the edge that cannot hide actual complexity - the core is a full computer, and needs a proper type system.

I'm not saying this change is going to happen over night, but we should be aiming for the correct approach. Every time a company says that they cannot release code because it is too complex, wouldn't be understandable, have third party dependencies, etc - what they're really saying is that their code base is a sloppy hack, they have no idea how it works, and they really do not want to own up to this state of affairs.

> For me or any company to support someone's quest to understand the code would be a very costly endeavor that you're simply not entitled too or nor would it be a reasonable request.

It might not be desirable according to a company's business interests, but what is actually unreasonable is to force purchasers and users of heavy equipment to blindly trust the software controlling those devices.

The non-computer people comment refers to the folks in the video; not this forum.

You also seem to be conflating right to repair vs. right to inspect code because you feel you have the right to do so for some reason (safety, don't like how it works, etc...). You don't have that right just like you don't have the right to walk into an assembly plant to see how your vehicle is assembled.

"The code, safety critical code especially, should be clear and should itself document the quirks of whatever it interacts with"

Agree and it does and we are audited by a 3rd party trained to looked at code written according to functional safety guidelines (ISO26262). Companies, like mine, don't have resources to respond to folks untrained on such matters. And for the non-safety aspects of the code, that's our intellectual property and our competitive advantage.

"Embedded has a culture of punting on abstractions due to the pervasiveness of cross cutting and global concerns"

You have data or proof of this or are you just talking from your personal experience? I assure you we take safety very seriously. Multiple millions are spent, as I said above, on testing to make sure code performs as expected; especially when a 3rd party audit and billions are on the line and, more importantly, the safety of our customers. You're inspection of the same code simply can't compete with the level of testing & auditing. You're really kidding yourself if you think otherwise.

"but 32-bit devices with dynamic allocation performing high level logical processing" Certain ASIL ratings dictate thou shall not perform dynamic allocations. You don't appear to be up to speed on functional safety matters.

"unreasonable is to force purchasers and users of heavy equipment to blindly trust the software controlling those devices."

Not true, disagree. It's unreasonable to assume we don't take safety seriously and demand to see our code when you can look at any company's functional safety audit records (they are public). To presume a right to change the code because you're not happy with some aspect of some functionality or you're concerned about safety is not your right and no company has the resources to support these requests from the general customer or public base. Moreover, as I already pointed out, it's our IP.

IP type code in this field is heavily guarded. Swath generation, swath acquisition, path planning are all very interesting algorithms that represent a company's IP.

What is your point? I have a relative that lost his arm to a combine. There was no lawsuit, he did not seek damages. Farmers are well aware of how dangerous this equipment is.
The point is I don't think allowing the modification of software in what is essentially a factory on wheels is a safe thing to do.

When we bought our '81 Ford there was a ton of bodge jobs and half-assed repairs(that helped us talk down the price) that I could easily verify by visual inspection. I knew because I could see them that they weren't inherently dangerous. Software doesn't have the same analogy in this space.

> The point is I don't think allowing the modification of software in what is essentially a factory on wheels is a safe thing to do.

Someone has to do it. What makes John Deere's embedded software engineers more qualified to write software for a factory on wheels than the embedded software engineers working directly for the farms?

Especially when we can't even check the former group's work.

"Someone has to do it. What makes John Deere's embedded software engineers more qualified..."

Simple, John Deere, probably like us, has spent more testing the software than you could ever do on your own.

You can't judge complex software just by looking at it. It must be tested. People who fail to understand this wind up making these uneducated comments. Go study ISO26262 and the MTB calculations required to pass it and maybe you'll change your tune.

Tested software runs on real vehicles and simulators at large companies, as I stated, running into the multi-million dollar price range. There is zero amount of code inspection the general public can do that would give the same assurances you get through testing.

Bottom line: just looking at code is not enough. You must test it. This is unit tests, simulations, field tests, harsh temperature, vibration, power cycle, high side/low side power distribution, code coverage, etc... None of this is possible by you inspecting code.

If this was a consumer product, sure. Tractors aren't consumer products and come with manuals for a reason.

You can't both try and chase the premium for a professional product, while locking down the professionals using it.

In such a scenario, if you were worried that the software was modified, you could flash the ROM with the OEMs software.
not if the modified code also modified the boot loader.
> I knew because I could see them that they weren't inherently dangerous. Software doesn't have the same analogy in this space.

This has a lot more to do with manufacturers unethical approach to closed and obfuscated opaque software than any inherent problem or limitation of the field.

You were able to recognize the problems or lack thereof for your car because a) you could actually see it, and b) you have more than passing familiarity with how cars work. There's no reason both of those can't be true for the vehicle firmware as well.

perhaps, but if you sold the equipment without telling the new owner they were running your code and they got hurt or killed, as I said above, companies don't want tie up their resources fighting these claims or dealing with it in the first place.
there is the doctrine of an 'attractive nuisance' [0] though, which gives precedent for making owners liable for damages caused to third parties by some dangerous object they did not sufficiently prevent access to... that easily hackable by the user marketing checkbox, combined with a sharp and pointy heavy agricultural spinning tool of death might count?

0. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attractive_nuisance_doctrine

That seems to apply to children.... I mean you should add some safeguards, to prevent the code from being modified by children messing around, but I dont think this would apply to an adult farmer trying to modify his tractor.