[justin66]

> For example, the easiest way to cut the price of loans down would be to kill anyone if they didn't pay; defaults — and loan costs — would fall dramatically.

You state that as a hypothetical, but it's not like this has never been tried. The loans handled by lenders who include the threat of violence in the repayment plan are absolutely not characterized by low costs.

[nemild]

But loans for these activities (such as a loanshark) have their own set of risks that have to be factored in and affect the interest rate:

- You may have no legal recourse and no collateral to seize

- The loan may be funding risky or illegal activity with a high likelihood of failure, which demands a higher interest rate

- There may be no competition that drives the price down

Ceteris paribus, increasing the cost of non-payment should reduce interest rates. If you relax the "ceteris paribus", then all bets are off.

Another way to see this is this question: if the lender had to forsake the threat of violence, would the loan price go up or down?

[justin66]

Introducing the threat of violence isn't smoothly adjusting a variable in a formula. It's introducing a gating factor that's going to keep not-desperate people from dealing with you.

[nemild]

I'm happy to discuss with you offline (see my profile). The point I'm trying to make is that increasing the ability for greater enforcement mechanisms, should — on average — reduce the cost of loans. As I point out, there are real debates about where to draw the line about what is appropriate lender enforcement that I've personally struggled with.

I apologize that my example isn't perfect, and you're absolutely right, there is selection bias, unless there is little recourse for other products.