| > Tor is far more fingerprintable than people think it is You seem to have no idea about the existence of pluggable transports.[1][2] > and its riddled with adversaries and malware. Yes, and so is I2P... Freenet... the Internet? > Even if you're good you have a separate problem now: Keeping the USG et al from painting a target on you. Isn't that an argument for using Tor? As Mike Perry (who works now on the vanguard proposal implementation) puts it, "we want enough people to actually use Tor Browser such that it becomes less interesting that you're a Tor user. We have plenty of academic research and mathematical proofs that tell us quite clearly that the more people use Tor, the better the privacy, anonymity, and traffic analysis resistance properties will become." > Just use a burner iPad and wipe it frequently. If you're truly paranoid light up a DigitalOcean droplet with a pre-paid credit card and a false name and install OpenVPN on it make an image and cycle your IP. Your IP will be known since you connect directly using your IP to the droplet. Also doesn't protect you from browser fingerprinting which alone may have leaked enough information to identify you. [1] : https://www.torproject.org/docs/pluggable-transports.html.en [2] : https://www.pluggabletransports.info/ (really good folks work on them, and we should appreciate the amount of work that they put in obfs research) |
Who is your adversary and what are the costs you are willing to bear to hide from them?
There are very few answers to that question that come out with: "Use Tor"
For the 99.9% of adversaries having a wipeable iPad will stop browser fingerprinting and switching up IPs or cafes will stop IP tracking. It wont stop network attacks, but you'll be pretty safe from 0days. For most journalists (or even drug dealers) it's the right approach.
The rest just gets you more heat than its worth.