| There are easily multiple locks that could be put in place internally. Encrypt the signal from the host to cash dispenser, have a debugger process that is connected to the host process that also stores the encryption keys and or talks to an HSM. Mitigates tampering of a live system, makes flashing new firmware problematic. Physically limit the cash dispenser from outputting k bills over n seconds. Have those limits be session based, again signaled by main host process. Would require a full login/logout cycle for k bills. Most likely, the systems are left wide open internally to ease development and mask bugs. My ending blanket statement is that finance people know how to be cheap, they can optimize along one axis, replacing a 5$ with a 2$ part, but the really good ones optimize the whole system over a long time horizon. |
NCR is focused on profits not security, even though they sell POS (point of sale), ATM machines, and airport kiosks.
From my personal dealings with NCR, I can confirm that they care very little for security, regardless of what their corporate line.
To put this in perspective: if you go to a grocery store, restaurant, or quick service (fast food) establishment and use a credit card then your full account number, name, and exp is recorded in their system. This information is accessible by anyone with store level admin (not windows admin, but think a manager with manager card).
This violates PCI but hey, fuck PCI, hard sending the system takes resources and who wants to do that?
On HN, folks keep talking about security and other such nonsense, however, anyone who has seen the other side isn’t very optimistic. Between ease of use, profit margins, and no pushback on insecure systems, all loses are just write offs.