[baby]

> To me, this article reads as a better example of the problems with the security industry and the way security research is done today, because I think the lesson to anyone watching is clear: don't build security into your products, because that makes you a target for researchers, even if you make the right decisions, and regardless of whether their research is practically important or not. It's much more effective to be Telegram: just leave cryptography out of everything, except for your marketing.

Honestly, this paper would be fine if it was just an analysis. The shitty thing about it is rather the prep'ed buzzy wired article

EDIT: I just noticed that Matthew Green published a blog post about this titled "Attack ...". That's really surprising :/

[muyuu]

>EDIT: I just noticed that Matthew Green published a blog post about this titled "Attack ...". That's really surprising :/

How so? He consistently sensationalises his stuff.