[cantrip]

This is a disaster, as it will likely succeed and in doing so make the entire world less secure.

Telegram is not a secure messaging platform, despite marketing themselves as such.

Signal has built a simple, seamless, and beautiful messaging platform whose security is based on solid cryptography, not marketing, bug contests, or chasing the latest tech fad.

[zeveb]

> Signal has built a simple, seamless, and beautiful messaging platform whose security is based on solid cryptography, not marketing, bug contests, or chasing the latest tech fad.

I love Signal, but it really could use non-phone-number identifiers (this could be easily implemented e.g. with tel: & mailto: URLs) and federation.

One place where Signal falls down is visible with the recent Haven app[0], which uses the Signal network to send messages. This is wonderful, but unfortunately it requires a second phone number to register the Haven device.

[0] https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.havenapp.m...

[tryptophan]

Matrix/Riot.im seems to meet your requirements. Best(open source) messaging protocol I've found so far.

https://matrix.org/

[jherdman]

> Telegram is not a secure messaging platform, despite marketing themselves as such.

Supporting sources?

[edraferi]

Basically, the problem is that they invented a lot of their own crypto from scratch. When asked about this, they said "it's fine, we're smart" and then claimed to prove their security with a red herring contest.

Here are some publications about security problems with the platform:

- A class project at MIT found several problems (May 2017) [0]

- They were featured on Crypto Fails (Dec 2013) [1]

- Jakob Jakobsen @ Aarhus University published a vulnerability discovery (May 2015) [2] and then did his Masters thesis on additional problems (Sep 2015) [3]

-Tomas Susanka @ Czech Technical University in Prague published additional vulnerabilities (2016) [4]

Plenty more out there.

[0] https://courses.csail.mit.edu/6.857/2017/project/19.pdf

[1] http://www.cryptofails.com/post/70546720222/telegrams-crypta...

[2] https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/1177.pdf

[3] http://cs.au.dk/~jakjak/master-thesis.pdf

[4] https://www.susanka.eu/files/telegram-article.pdf

[Vinnl]

There's this, by a respected cryptographer who, however, also is the author of Signal: https://moxie.org/blog/telegram-crypto-challenge/

[miaklesp]

Any less biased source?

[45h34jh53k4j]

Moxie might have his own horse in the race, but his analysis of cryptosystems should not be questioned. His philosophy is around humans being able to access strong encryption. I believe he ultimately doesn't care what you use, as long as your communications are secure.

[Vinnl]

And to illustrate that, he worked with Facebook to add Signal's encryption to WhatsApp (and Google to Allo).

[thsowers]

I haven't used Telegram in a while (so maybe things have changed since then), but I would guess that that grandparent is talking about how they rolled their own crypto, and how secure conversations isn't the default setting

[jakebasile]

> Signal has built a simple, seamless, and beautiful messaging platform

I admire Signal for its security, and Mr. Marlinspike et al. have contributed much to the field but seamless and beautiful are not words I'd use to describe Signal.

- Their desktop "app" is but an Electron app that feels native nowhere and is built from their old Chrome plugin

- The app requires my phone to be on and connected (I am aware of why this is).

- Their iPad app is non-existent and if ever released (no indication I can find that it is even planned) it would likely have the same requirement to keep my phone on and connected.

- It doesn't appear possible to search conversations.

- If I transfer to a new device, all my messages are gone unless I restore from a backup.

To give an alternative secure messenger that has less of these problems, I've been investigating Wire. It has some of the same drawbacks vs Telegram but lacks the primary flaw of Signal's design: the dependence on my phone.

But both Wire and Signal have one problem that I can't easily work around: No one I know uses them. No one I know wants to use them, because the user experience and convenience of the less secure messengers outweigh the decreased security.