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Not allow user processes to recover from a SEGV. The attack depends on a signal hander that traps the signal and resumes execution. If this is disabled then the attack will not work. This would affect two types of systems:

1. Badly written code where bugs are being masked by the handler. 2. Any kind of virtualization?

So, for cloud providers it looks like a 30% performance hit, but for the rest of us I would rather have a patch that stops applications handling the SEGV trap.

[caf]

The attacks do not rely on recovering from SIGSEGV. The speculated execution that accesses out-of-bounds or beyond privilege level happens in a branch that's predicted-taken but actually not-taken, so the exception never occurs.

[314]

Ah, ok - then I read the paper wrongly. i’ll go back and have another look.

Edit: yes, I missed the details in section 4.1 when I skimmed through. I’m not familiar with the Kocker paper, but I assume the training looks like this?

for(int i=0 i<n; i++) if(i==n-1) do_probe();