Even a low-power core like a Cortex-M7 can do some speculative execution through its branch predictor.
Though of course a M7 isn't running VMs, and probably isn't running any kind of attacker-controlled code (scripting included - its there, but rare), so many of the vectors aren't present.
Then front-runs the negotiated timeline anyway, catching projects like Xen off guard (it seems like)[0]. Will be interested to read the postmortem of the entire process from start to finish, and Xen is promising one from their perspective. I'd be especially interested to understand whether public intel was concrete enough to rush this out the door, because it didn't seem like it was, but I probably missed something.
I reimplemented variant 3 based solely on clues from twitter posts yesterday.
I am by no means a computer security guru - I just did a CPU architecture course at uni and figured I'd cowboy up an implementation. It worked nearly first time, and can read both kernel and userspace pages from userspace by fooling the branch predictor into going down the wrong path, and relying on the permission checks to be slower than the data reads from a virtually addressed cache. It can only access stuff already cached though, so you can't do a full memory dump with it.
speculation was apparently hitting very close to home allowing attackers with resources (think nation states) to start developing their own tooling. at least this early announcement allows people with sensitive data to quickly move to dedicated instances.
edit: well it didn't take a nation state after all: https://twitter.com/brainsmoke/status/948561799875502080 - given that, you can be sure that everybody who counts is frantically launching these on your clouds gathering whatever they can.
As far as I know they HAVE to register a trade in advance. I.E. three months ahead: "I will sell 600 shares on 15th of December if the share price is above 50". This information is public and other people can use this information before the trade actually happens.
What!