[Dylan16807]

It's definitely good to be aware of what tricks you have. Sometimes you need to do weird things like treat memory as hostile, see this article about chrome sandboxing: https://lwn.net/Articles/347547/

> So that's what we do: each untrusted thread has a trusted helper thread running in the same process. This certainly presents a fairly hostile environment for the trusted code to run in. For one, it can only trust its CPU registers - all memory must be assumed to be hostile. Since C code will spill to the stack when needed and may pass arguments on the stack, all the code for the trusted thread has to [be] carefully written in assembly.

> The trusted thread can receive requests to make system calls from the untrusted thread over a socket pair, validate the system call number and perform them on its behalf. We can stop the untrusted thread from breaking out by only using CPU registers and by refusing to let the untrusted code manipulate the VM in unsafe ways with mmap, mprotect etc.

(I don't know if that technique is still used)

[kindfellow92]

This trick doesn’t avoid the storage of this data into RAM. A single context switch is enough.

[Dylan16807]

Context switches put it into kernel memory, not process memory. That's safe.