So what's your actual threat model here? The Government decides to ban people from accessing Government services? Err... Or that some person might not be able to activate their Mobile ID for a short period of time while they sort out their ID cards?
The threat model is exactly people getting locked out of government services.
If this seems silly or not important to you then you aren't aware just how widespread the usage of digital government services are in Estonia.
As one example most government procurements over a certain amount od money happen as e-procurements with strict time limits that can't be changed and bids need to be digitally signed. If you can't access digital government services you can neither access e-procurment site nor digitally sign you bid.
Right, but point is, you can quite easily have Mobile-ID and your ID card, and if something happens to your ID card you can still use Mobile-ID. I think.
If there's no redundancy measure for the ID card system failing - for example, automatically extending deadlines - that's a problem, and an easily solvable one at that, since it's mostly policy. It's not something against the ID card system.
Yes, but you need to already have Mobile-ID for that. To get a Mobile-ID you need ID-Card with valid certs.
So if a person doesn't already have Mobile-ID and their ID-Card certs are blocked they can't get a Mobile-ID and thus they can't access any digital government services.
It's not like this is purely theoretical - large number of Estonian Id-Card will have their certs blocked and not everyone has Mobile-ID.
Just like you need a valid e-mail to sign up somewhere. Except that here you won't need it afterwards (even if your ID is compromised, it can be blocked and the other systems provide secure identity.)
All of this is backed by the "single basket" of people actually showing up in the population registry office...
PS: I see, you have just joined HN to write these unsubstantiated comments.