[throwawaysml]

For that purpose I would think optional whitelisting would make more sense. Instead of spyware lists you subscribe to in uBlock Origin, you would subscribe to a vetted, whitelist of known to be generally acceptable Orchid content.

Others might want to have empty filter list to be a complete transit/peer.

Therefore I don't think there's much room for users who want to blacklist but are not rather looking for a whitelist.

The blacklist will grow and grow, while the whitelist size will be pretty stable.

That said, I haven't used it, so the implemented blacklist approach might already support the above cases and be sufficient.

[saurik]

FWIW, as the person who has been doing the initial implementation, I can tell you that we currently only have a whitelist. I can appreciate why the person who was editing the FAQ for the website put in the world "blacklist" as it makes the sentence flow really well, but I agree with you about the issues (and there are also problems doing the distributed hashtable search to find nodes that don't have some property rather than ones that do have some property). I will poke about this to see if I can get it changed ASAP!

[kirillseva]

If you're only using a "stable whitelist" of websites on the internet then you're not the target audience

[throwawaysml]

I know what you mean, but for this to be more widely used than Tor there is a need for me to know that nodes I operate only process stuff that won't be identified by 3rd party to sue me into a jail or financial ruin.

When I say whitelist, I do assume prefixes in the DHT (or whatever design they're using) can be used, as otherwise the whitelist may also grow too big to be practical. If however it will gain the concept of domains or such (which is also kinda a prefix), a whitelist will also be more practical.

Tor exit nodes are not operated by many in various places where they would/could because of concerns of the exit node addresses being enough to legally ruin operators' lives, even though technically it's a pure transit. Nobody sues the county because someone committed vehicular manslaughter on their public road. But because laws are skewed against the Internet right now, all someone needs is an exit node IP to make you regret.

If, and there's little to analyze/go by right now public, nodes and everyone is totally oblivious to what packets are transmitted; and if also the packets stored on nodes' disks are encrypted/sealed, then one could assume a filterless system to be practical.

This is all speculation, based on the little info there is. I really hope the team has come up with better designs that obliviate the concerns surrounding Tor, and ideally also not suffer from Freenet like slowness.

EDIT: Of course, once you have a filter, you will need to deal with the responsibility like Youtube does. If you do not know what's on disk or passing through, which is the ideal technically, then it would be best for the Internet and free communication. So, I'm not sure if a filter is a good idea, if that means you get subpoena'd and held liable for enabling one too many whitelist subscriptions.

[woodandsteel]

I may be wrong, but my impression is they have more than one target audience. They want to hit the whole public, but also smaller groups who are having problems like government internet censorship.

[woodandsteel]

That makes sense, the priority is whitelists, not blacklists.