| Finding new semantics for constructing computational logic is certainly a good middle-of-the-road innovation. The philisophical underpinnings of my own research and practice over the past decade are in constant existential friction with many of the most basic assumptions that underlie information theory. I've argued about it on here before. Since I'm terrified of general AI developing under the current power-dynamic, I haven't been too enthusiastic about contributing. That said, a lot needs to be disbelieved-- we need an ideological grass fire on the great plans, of sorts-- before certain types of phenomenon can be reliably conjured through our electrical counting machines. We've mistaken the representation with the thing itself, especially in the 'information sciences.' The idea of 'information' and 'data' as 'packets' presupposes the existence of a physical world composed of neatly delineated objects. While this has been and continues to be a convenient and even useful approximation of reality, it is still that-- a representation. I've never seen this assumption questioned Im CS/IS forums. At this point, it's beyond dogma. The unbelievable volume and density of the knowledge built in the information sciences, all of it sewn into these base assumptions of information theory, generate in the unwitting practitioner a belief considered as a hard-as-bedrock fact, always presumed but never questioned. It's confirmation bias propping up a simulacra of reality. Like physics did last century, our latest IS works (like general AI) are hitting the hard limit on these assumptions. What's next? Try deconstructing it yourself. That's part of the fun, and helpful in the creative process. In the mean time It would be nice to see new ways of visualizing code and code execution, that's probably a good start. Code in Motion – An Interstellar Inspired Visualization for the JVM - https://vimeo.com/96317948
Code Galaxies Visualization - http://anvaka.github.io/pm/
Binary data visualization - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=15164166 |