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by JumpCrisscross 3163 days ago
> Can a company exist in both the "normal" exchange and the "long term" exchange at the same time?

Strictly speaking, nobody needs an exchange to implement a corporate voting regime where one's vote per share increases as a function of holding time. You just amend your certificate of incorporation and/or bylaws and, assuming the state in which you're incorporate allows it, it happens.

The trouble is most stock exchanges have rules about voting rights. If you aren't compliant, you can't list with them. A big-ticket IPO, e.g. Uber, Airbnb or Saudi Aramco, might be able to convince an exchange to change its rules. This is an exchange pre-empting that negotiation.

If a quality company listed with these voting rights, there would be nowhere you could buy its shares where voting rights would be different because they'd all trace to the same corporate charter. There might just, at least for some time, fewer places where one could buy them.

(Stock lending would have to be dealt with. It doesn't strike me as a particularly challenging issue to solve, and not everyone has to solve it the same way. The bigger issue is where to sever legal and beneficial ownership. If I have a bunch of LLCs who have held a company's stock since IPO, it might make more sense to sell the LLCs with their voting rights intact than sell out of them. This torpedoes most of the benefits of public over private markets.)

1 comments

That all but guarantees a lower stock price over time for the company, as newer shares are literally less valuable than older shares. If you have “high priority” voting shares worth $100, they could be worth $90 or less to the investor that is buying them because they decrease in value on every trade.
> That all but guarantees a lower stock price over time for the company, as newer shares are literally less valuable than older shares

Which is why you see private companies experimenting with all manner of super-voting classes of stock (usually for founders) but never with this idea. New money would be reticent to invest.

Devil's advocate: investors didn't seem to care about Snaps' zero-vote stock.

We believe our proposal is way more investor favorable than zero-vote shares. But it’s also way more company-favorable than standard governance