[j_s]

Most Tor busts follow a similar pattern, watching both ends of the connection.

There is a real need for a "tor delay" metadata-disruption-as-a-service, where random strangers invoke one another's web callbacks and report back the result in exchange for Bitcoin (Strangers on a Train -style). Someone put it on the block chain and start an ICO!

[dx034]

same risk as hosting an exit node. It could take a while convincing police that you obfuscated traffic patterns without any involvement in the crimes they're after. I think most people wouldn't want to take that risk.

[thecrazyone]

Either you are missing the point or I am.

As I understand random strangers are logged on to tor and invoke each others' callbacks and give back results. Since all of them are anonymized, This is not at all similar to an exit node.

The only purpose of this is to make tor packet traffic patterns hard to follow :)

This could be a service, but not sure if this can be filtered out by the snooper. These will be one off requests from random nodes and will not affect your tor traffic pattern much because I posit the signal to noise ratio of your main activity will be pretty high. Hmm, :thinking: perhaps if we jack up this random traffic, would that hide your main traffic maybe.

Anyone who knows such analyses want to chime in? :)