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by thinkloop
3179 days ago
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I don't understand what the "privacy nightmare" is that the author describes: > The credential itself is signed by the issuer, which makes it authentic and binds it its owner. In itself this does not appear to create a big privacy problem, compared to standard PKI certificates. However, one of the keynotes suggested that also uses, i.e. verifications, of credentials could be logged on the blockchain. That information could subsequently be used to make e.g. policy decisions on employability: which academic credentials lead to the best employment opportunities? This is a privacy nightmare. And is the author suggesting simply checking credentials against a centralized authority: > All you need is that each issuer keeps a list of all issued credentials in a local immutable record (using a simple hash-chain, for example) against which a verifier can check the status of a credential. My comprehension of this article is low. |
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And how would that work anyway? He just finished saying that everything on the chain is public. You don't have to issue a transaction to read it, you can just read the public information off your local node.