[pron]

> Because they're part of the Social Sciences.

Critical theory? No. It's more part of the humanities.

> Well, it certainly purports to be.

Absolutely not. Why do you think that? Even many actual social scholars (historians, anthropologists) would object to being called scientists, or, at least, would always emphasize that if you want to call what they do science, it is not science in the same sense as chemistry.

[msla]

Them using the term "theory" while not doing any of the hard work of science is equivocation.

[pron]

They're doing hard work, just not scientific work. It's not "better" or "worse" than science; it's just something completely different. Science doesn't have a monopoly on the word "theory". It's been in use long before science (at least as we know it since the 17th century) existed.

[msla]

> They're doing hard work, just not scientific work. It's not "better" or "worse" than science; it's just something completely different.

It's amazing how much of this would apply to alchemy, or astrology, or religion.

So the question becomes, why would anyone pay attention to it?

[pron]

Why would anyone pay attention to science? It all depends on what you want to achieve and what your values are. The difference between alchemy and literature is that alchemy purports to have the same goals as science -- at which it fails -- while literature has completely other goals.

[msla]

I'm not talking about literature. I'm talking about critical theory, which is not the same thing, and is a much later innovation.

Literature has proven itself useful. Critical theory has not.

(Also, I notice you didn't distinguish what makes critical theory different from religion.)

[pron]

> I'm not talking about literature. I'm talking about critical theory, which is not the same thing, and is a much later innovation.

The two, as academic disciplines, have a lot in common (at least those parts of critical theory that I think you're referring to).

> Literature has proven itself useful. Critical theory has not.

I'm not sure how you make that assertion.

> what makes critical theory different from religion.

The way I learned it back in grad school years ago, religion doesn't have a precise definition but it is almost always required to have a normative component (which critical theory lacks) as well as some transcendence over ordinary existence (which critical theory also lacks). It is therefore debatable whether belief in cryonics or AI singularity, or the Silicon Valley-centered Rationality movement constitutes a religion (they are all normative and transcendental), but I see no way how critical theory can even be considered a religion any more than knitting could; I see no point of similarity. And no, consideration of truths without scientific evidence is neither necessary nor sufficient for being a religion. I consider Dostoevsky a primary source of truth, yet Dostoevsky is not a religion. It's truth of a different kind than scientific truth, but so is the truth of critical theory (or, rather, those "mushy" parts of it, that I think you're alluding to). If it resembles religion in any way is in its goal to interpret reality, rather than examine it merely factually, but, of course, interpretation is nor a sufficient condition for a religion, and probably not a necessary one, either.