[zeveb]

I'll grant that the conspiracy theory does explain the facts you mention (as well as the fact that Signal shares contacts with OWS), but I think that a simpler theory explains the facts too: the the OWS guys really do want to get some crypto into the hands of the masses, and are willing for their product to be less secure than it could be if it means that end users are more secure than they'd otherwise be (i.e., they believe the alternative to Signal-as-it-is is not Signal-as-it-could-be but rather SMS).

Tying things to a phone number makes sense in order to reduce Sybil attacks, but I think that OWS could operate a phone-number-based identity service which would be relied upon by federated Signal servers, reducing the degree centralisation while still preserving Sybil resistance. This matters because without Sybil resistance it'd be pretty easy for a malicious party to send a Signal user 10,000,000 messages per second, saturating his data connexion and depleting his battery; tying identity to phone number makes it easier to limit & block such bad actors.

[mullen]

> Tying things to a phone number makes sense in order to reduce Sybil attacks, but I think that OWS could operate a phone-number-based identity service which would be relied upon by federated Signal servers, reducing the degree centralisation while still preserving Sybil resistance. This matters because without Sybil resistance it'd be pretty easy for a malicious party to send a Signal user 10,000,000 messages per second, saturating his data connexion and depleting his battery; tying identity to phone number makes it easier to limit & block such bad actors.

I think people who are for anonymous use of Signal don't understand that the bulk of Signals users don't want anyone who is anonymous to contact them. If I don't know who you are or I can not track you down, then you can't contact me.

[zeveb]

I don't think too many people want the people they communicate with using Signal to be anonymous to them; they want them to be anonymous to Open Whisper Systems. Ideally, OWS would have no way to know that I'm talking to my best friend, or who we are.

Getting that to work is tricky, but it'd be awesome.

I can imagine a system where users prove possession to OWS of their phone numbers via SMS — as they currently do — and OWS issues them certificates using some sort of blind signature scheme; they can then use those certificates to prove to any server they talk to that they are someone with an identity, and the server can use a subsidiary certificate to demonstrate to other servers that it's acting on behalf of someone with an identity (but not whose identity), and the recipient's server can rate-limit based on that identity, and potentially even record information to aid in manually tracking someone down — without revealing the identity in normal use.

I could be wrong, and I've definitely not proven that it can work. But I think it can be made to.

[micheljones]

I agree with you; I'm not some crazy kookoo yelling about judgement day on the corner, this is just some 'food for thought' discussion.

For the first part of your argument, the issues I mention do not affect the security of the product (signal) itself, they would just enable spooks to more easily sidestep the whole product.

I also do not have anything against using the phone number as uid, it's 'good enough' for most people, and it greatly simplifies things. It is a very sensible default. What I'm questioning is the hardline stance of not allowing anything else at all - while 90% of people would be fine with signal as is, why not give the remaining 10% of us kookoos a bit more freedom?

As for the Sybil attack, does signal allow users not in your 'buddy list' to send you messages?

[zeveb]

I'm with you — I'd love it if (internally) Signal user IDs were URLs, e.g. tel:[phone] — which would mean they could also be email addresses or anything else.

I think Signal allows anyone to send messages; I don't think it only permits communication when both parties have one another in their contact lists.