[ethan_g]

To be clear, regulatory capture is when the regulator advances the interests of the industry rather than of the public. Revolving door is a separate issue.

There's an interesting argument that the revolving door actually prevents regulatory capture through encouraging regulators to be more strict. The idea is that the more onerous the regulations, the more desireable it is for corporations to hire former regulators who know the system. "Keep your friends close, and your enemies closer."

Matt Levine's take on it: https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2014-06-26/strict-re...

[michaelt]

The revolving door doesn't require regulators to be more strict.

All it needs is for companies to give big rewards (six figure salary for a day a month of work) to regulators who have previously done things the companies like.

Then their replacements will know strengthening regulations is against their personal interests.

You don't hire an ex-regulator for their expertise, you hire them as payment for services already rendered.

[willvarfar]

The problem with civil servants taking high paid jobs when they leave is that it can be a payoff for being biased for the company. If companies can dangle the carrot of an eventual job the civil servant will avoid actions that sink their chances.

There's a lot of stuff on real revolving doors in the UK in the magazine Private Eye. Stomach turning really.

[anigbrowl]

Nobody is arguing in favor of the revolving door, they're just pointing out how it differs from regulatory capture. Don't argue for the sake of argument.

[joe_the_user]

There's an interesting argument that the revolving door actually prevents regulatory capture through encouraging regulators to be more strict.

So "interesting" now means is "deceptive and ingenuous".

In a hypothetical world where corporations were akin to mom-and-pop bakeries that would need to hire power, sophisticated regulators to guide them through a very tough state, that argument might be plausible.

In the real world where corporations are powerful, forward-looking institutions who know full well that paying people involves a process of rewarding behavior, this argument says more about the person advancing it than anything else.

And sure, a lot of smart people might claim this, just as similar stable of smart people operate in the stable of the corporations writing arguments for newspapers and magazine. But maybe all those people aren't at all tainted in their views. I'm sure they could come up with hypothetical situations where they aren't.

[ethan_g]

>stable of smart people operate in the stable of the corporations writing arguments for newspapers and magazine

I'm not sure if you're suggesting Matt Levine is "in the stable of corporations", but if you read his article history, he's clearly not. One reason (among many) it's fun to read him, is his incisive criticism of his previous jobs in finance and law.