[westoncb]

Here's another way of thinking about it: the non-hard problem of consciousness (I think it's unfair to call it the 'easy' problem—though it's definitely easier) deals with the behavior and structure of a system which has some physical incarnation (whether in circuits or neurons or whatever); the hard problem on the other hand is about the subjectivity involved in being the system—which is no longer a question about the behavior/structure of systems.

I think the difference in type of question is like: if our universe is likened to a board game with some finite set of rules, e.g. Monopoly, the 'physics' of this universe is fully determined by the rules of the game (even if there are non-deterministic aspects where you have to e.g. roll dice). The non-hard problem of consciousness is a question in this realm, like "can I sell one of my properties to another player?"; the hard problem is necessarily outside the scope of the rules; it's a question more like, "what is the molecular composition of a 'Chance' card?". Unfortunately, the question is being asked inside of the game and all that's available in attempt to answer it are the constructs and rules from the game.

It's an interesting thing to consider because in some ways what it discusses is what we have the most direct empirical access to—and yet it's also one of the most clearly unapproachable topics which we couldn't usefully say anything definite about (except that its inaccessibility is interesting)