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by walterbell 3222 days ago
Yes, usage of isolated browser instances should be restricted to information within a single context or risk profile. E.g. a stateless, frequently rebooted VM for occasional use of a particular extension. Or a Bromium micro-VM for each tab, redirect, etc.
1 comments
testestx 3222 days ago
This is totally impractical, or people would be already doing this when using other browsers as a defense in depth thing.
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walterbell 3222 days ago
Bromium claims to be seamless to end-users, but it's not available to consumers, except on some HP devices, https://www.theregister.co.uk/2017/02/13/hp_bromium_virtuali...

As for practicality, if your daily workflow involves a browser extension that has no replacement, the options are:

  - stop doing the task
  - all browsing with insecure browser, no isolation
  - single task with insecure browser, no isolation
  - single task with insecure browser, some isolation
Most people will do #2 or #3. Those who care about security will do #4, with quality of isolation dependent on their threat model.
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