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by gnaritas
3284 days ago
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> Its a tragedy of the commons. Alternatively, it's a feature. The miners "are" the network, them rejecting a change is the network saying no democratically, and that was the intent of the way things were setup, this is how it's supposed to work. A change that hurts miners profits isn't good for the network because it'll reduce mining and thus reduce security of the network overall. So while a change to increase transaction volumes might be good for currency holders; holders aren't the ones providing security, miners are, and the incentives are setup this way for a reason, it keeps the network secure thus providing the value for the currency to begin with. |
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Err... no. Nodes define and police consensus in bitcoin, not miners. It is the fact that nodes, and not miners, not agreeing to changes that miners want that would lead to the centralization of the network into miners hands, that is the entire argument about scalability and blocksize.
> them rejecting a change is the network saying no democratically
Yes, it is the nodes rejecting change that is leading to little to no change. The nodes have overwhelmingly agreed to an upgrade, and the largest miner, bitmain, is resisting it, so there may be some truth to the assertion that miners don't want this upgrade because they perceive they will lose profit from it. The fact that the nodes are looking to 'go over bitmains head' and implement this change without the need for the largest blocking miner, that is the entire reason the 'new york agreement' was developed in the first place.
But we do agree on the core issue. The lack of the ability to easily change is a feature of the design. The incentives are slightly misaligned with the implementation of asicboost, but for the most part, they function as expected.