[CaptSpify]

> You do have protections against someone reading your email at Google.

And those protections are bullshit.

I have no guarantee that they are not reading my email. If a bot has access, a person has access, and people abuse their access all the time.

In fact, there have been cases of googlers reading peoples email. And I'm not blurring any line, I'm stating: Gmail can, has been, and will be abused. To pretend that is not the case is, frankly, naive.

[jsmthrowaway]

I know this is cold comfort, but every single production data access is audited at Google, and that's after one signs more NDAs than you can shake a stick at to even get logs access in the first place. Each incident, with David Barksdale being the worst, has made them lock down logs, PII, and production access at a level unprecedented of any I've seen (including HIPAA shops).

You're correct that the possibility exists, but any Googler inhales heavily and makes sure their paperwork is in order before accessing prod. The warnings that are displayed are not unlike those when you're removing a nuclear core on a starship. It's scary. They want it that way. You need a damned good reason to even look at subject lines in the inbox (like fixing a bug involving subject line rendering that only appears with a user's specific subject line, for instance), and clicking a message is almost certainly a walk. Like, within the day.

They do take this seriously. I wouldn't call it bullshit. The protections I observed were in place before Snowden, so I imagine it's even more rigorous now.

[CaptSpify]

I'm sure they have a lot of checks, but that doesn't really matter if:

A) they can be bypassed, as they have been in the past

B) they can be compelled to hand that data elsewhere

So I'm calling bullshit. Until it's impossible for them to look at my data, then they aren't taking it seriously.

[jsmthrowaway]

You're calling bullshit on what, exactly? I'm providing you perspective on the very thing you're hypothesizing about from firsthand experience.

What is your technical solution for operating Gmail without any Googler having the ability to access some aspect of your data? It's email on the Web. Handling that e2e is pretty much intractable, and cleartext or nearly-cleartext with online keys has to exist somewhere even without the Googley things they do to data. I might posit that building a functional service with that requirement would be impossible for the Gmail case and many others (but I'm ready to be proven wrong).

[CaptSpify]

>> They do take this seriously. I wouldn't call it bullshit. > You're calling bullshit on what, exactly?

really? your firsthand experience is nice, but your ignoring that those methods don't work.

> What is your technical solution for operating Gmail without any Googler having the ability to access some aspect of your data?

They can use any of the current zero-knowledge encryption methods. This isn't anything new and has been around for a long time. There's no need for Google to have those keys.

Encryption isn't a new problem for email, it's already a thing.

[fserb]

what's the use case you are worried about? Tell me a story. Who is accessing your date, for which purpose, when, how much, etc... and explain how Gmail is a bad solution because Google "can read it".

Yes, Google does not offer you protection against the Government. That is a true statement. But that doesn't mean that it's all or none. There are so many privacy rights before "a warrant request". And news flash, unless you are extremely good at securing your own mail server, even then you are not protected against a warrant.

Those checks are not bullshit. Every single security system "can be bypassed".

[CaptSpify]

The use case is pretty obvious by now: people trying to manipulate me (ads), overreaching government intrusion, and invasions of privacy.

I never said that Google just sends everything over to them, but they can come and access my data without me ever knowing, and that's a problem. Just because there are (imo broken) checks in place does nothing to negate that fact.

Those checks are provably bullshit by the previous breaches. If they weren't bullshit, there would never have been breaches.

[fserb]

as I said, government intrusion can't be defended as is. Name one web technology that is government intrusion proof. Fuck that. Name on technology that is so. Air gapping isn't. Granted, air gapping allows you to at least know about it. But that's that.

"invasions of privacy" is not a use case. Give me details. By whom? Your partner? Your coworker? 4chan? Your mayor? Russia? What information are they getting from you? Why? It's very likely that whatever use case you come up with, you are better defended with 2auth gmail than with whatever other solution.

That's a problem with the web. In 15 years, and not counting legal government requests, there were what? 3 cases of email data breaches that were caught? 5? That's your "provably bullshit"? What do you use on your life that has a lower failure rate than this?

[CaptSpify]

> as I said, government intrusion can't be defended as is.

yes it can. zero-knowledge encryption is already a thing.

> Name one web technology that is government intrusion proof.

Apparently the iPhone is. pgp encryption is another one. I'd suggest brushing up on basic security before saying things like that.

> "invasions of privacy" is not a use case.

Why not?

> By whom?

By anyone that I don't authorize. Sure, that could be my partner, coworker, any government authority, etc.

> What information are they getting from you?

Are you serious? If you don't even understand that threat model, then again, I'd suggest looking in basic security models.

> you are better defended with 2auth gmail

2auth gmail is orthogonal to the issue. That's an security method. Currently Google does that but still can grant access to anyone they want. That's a problem that 2auth doesn't address.

> not counting legal government requests

Why not? Why remove a legitimate security issue from the discussion?

> 3 cases of email data breaches that were caught

I have no idea how many have been caught, once again, that's orthogonal to the issue. How many examples doesn't matter. It's that they do have access and can do it whenever they want.

> What do you use on your life that has a lower failure rate than this?

That's a completely illogical argument. "We shouldn't ensure privacy/security because other things in life fail more often" makes no sense.