[simias]

How about a "security through obscurity" countermeasure for sensitive systems where we'd use a special compiler that adds a bunch of "noise" in the generated algorithm (useless instructions etc...)?

Or alternatively run the algorithm through an emulator that does the same thing.

[JoachimSchipper]

Modern tooling will look for correlations; (fixed) useless instructions per se don't help, since the signal can still be found in the original instructions.

However, the attacks all rely on reducing noise by combining measurements. Introducing sufficiently-long random delays or sufficiently-big variations in clock speed can make it harder to combine measurements, and can thus stop such attacks. Unfortunately, making trace alignment hard is not so much a provably-correct fix as a contest between the hardware designer's ability to be really annoying and the attacker's intuition (to find usable synchronization points) and sheer persistence.

(If you want to rely on such things, you really need to get a top-notch hardware attack lab such as Riscure to look at your countermeasures; you really want to test against an experienced attacker's intuition.)

[5gaKanchAFD2]

Yeah techniques like instruction re-ordering, messing with the clock, etc are legitimate options. However all they will effectively do is decrease the signal-to-noise ratio of the system; increasing the number of measurements the adversary will need to require.

The power of averaging is such that these extra security added by these types of countermeasure can rapidly drop to zero. Despite this there are some use cases and deployment environments in which this might still be worth doing.

Ultimately the game for people deploying SCA-resistant hardware is effectively to fix a period of time in which a single key is used, and add sufficient countermeasures to ensure that the attacker can't get the key within that period. 'Perfect' security isn't a strict requirement at all, nor is it possible to achieve.