[kefka]

Wow. This is a 30 day trial offer over supposed "hardened controls". Pardon my skepticism, but proof or GTFO.

I already have access to ZeroMQ, RabbitMQ, Mosquitto, Californium, and plenty more. And they all are open source under reasonable licenses.

So can someone please tell me:

     1. Why should I trust your claim of security?
     2. Why your product is worth money when I can go Open Source for free?
     3. Why should I deal with Vendor lockin?
     4. Why should I trust you?

Well... The obvious answer is that it's not worth it, at any cost.

EDIT: I flagged it. I would encourage others to do the same. This is bad, horrible, no good junkware.

[dwviel]

BTW, why did you flag this post with out giving me a chance to reply?

[dwviel]

Thanks for your thoughtful comments. Yes, I can understand your skepticism, and that is a good sign that you don’t believe whatever folks are just saying. That is particularly good in the cybersecurity field as claims that are unsubstantiated are often made.

The problem with cybersecurity is that you can’t prove a negative proposition. That is, it’s not possible to prove that a system will never be hacked. That said, there are ways of increasing the cybersecurity of a system to the extent that a compentent attacker, i.e. a nation-state actor, will need to commit significant time, personnel, and resources to attempt to mount a serious attack. Most likely they will look elsewhere to attack rather than the network interface that our product protects.

We have achieved a high level of cybersecurity by using several principles (in addition to CIAA): 1) Integrate the cybersecurity capability with the middleware so it is “built in” into the same product. 2) Limit our scope to controls systems messages so as to leverage the highly constrained nature of these kinds of fixed format messages to have an extremely small attack surface. 3) Use logical construction of mechanisms to specify what should only happen, and then rigorously prevents anything but that from happening. 4) Root the security in H/W. 5) Protect the full S/W stack from H/W to the application 6) Enforce an autonomous posture for all components to prevent a “brittle” system architecture, which would lock components together.

As to your specific questions: 1) The only way to evaluate the cybersecurity of a system is through penetration testing. We’ve had several highly competent teams evaluate our technology and have failed to defeat it in any way. You should have your own penetration test teams test all of your systems before you put them into production, and then periodically continue to test them for vulnerabilities. That said, no system is perfectly secure. But, we’ve been accepting systems with poor cybersecuity for quite a while, it’s time to raise the bar on what is acceptable cybersecurity. 2) You are free to choose open source or any product. The problem with current technologies is that they were designed before the kind of high-level cybersecurity we expect today was understood. These existing technologies are wed to their current protocols which can’t be patched to make them more secure. Only a redesign from scratch will do that, which is tantamount to abandoning their current protocols. 3) Vendors provide a product with features that are useful. That’s why we use them. Control of the technology is needed to ensure the proper implementation of the principles outlined above. 4) You shouldn’t. See answer to question 1) above. We need to earn your trust. In a sense, cybersecurity is a conspiracy of trust. Without trust there is no security.

Some further details are provided on the website: www.cognoscentisystems.com

I would be happy to answer any other questions you may have.

David Viel

[kefka]

I flagged it because I saw this as a hand-wavey "magic code" combined with a website filled with market-ese. I've been long enough in this industry to smell this at a distance. But I see the [DEAD] was rescinded. Ill be willing to rescind my flag since a rep of the company is here (you).

_________________________________

> Yes, I can understand your skepticism, and that is a good sign that you don’t believe whatever folks are just saying. That is particularly good in the cybersecurity field as claims that are unsubstantiated are often made.

It really has to do with multiple things here. First, is a new crypto implementation. That sets of major alarms with me, no matter who writes it. Especially so being infrastructure, this should be open source and publicly accessible for review.

Secondly, you're using a new IP protocol. Full stop. This should be absolutely IETF standard, reference design, full engineering review, kind of code. I see none of that. I would get not having gone this route if you're trying to get a new protocol spun up with a reference design. I'm thinking of IPFS, where everything's open and done in public on GitHub and IRC. In my opinion, they're going on the route of getting an IETF standard in a different way (of utmost transparency and collaboration).

_________________________________

> The problem with cybersecurity is that you can’t prove a negative proposition. That is, it’s not possible to prove that a system will never be hacked. That said, there are ways of increasing the cybersecurity of a system to the extent that a compentent attacker, i.e. a nation-state actor, will need to commit significant time, personnel, and resources to attempt to mount a serious attack. Most likely they will look elsewhere to attack rather than the network interface that our product protects.

You want to play this game? Sure, I'll bite. How do you know you don't have a protocol error baked in at the definition of how your stuff works? Sure, you all were smart enough to build it, and some pentesters you hired said it was OK. The basic idea with RFC's was that everyone, collectively across the world could collaborate on how a protocol would work, or not. Failure domains could be identified and caught before a full standard was made. Have there been errors in these base protocols? Sure have. But they collectively have been fixed.

How do you plan to have peer review of your protocol, let alone your implementation? Hope and prayer, I guess. And when it comes to infrastructure, that's nowhere near good enough for me. I need an open, peer reviewed protocol with a clear reference example. You can build your middleware and I'd consider purchasing that for value-add. But "No Way" with regards to the actual protocol.

_________________________________

> As to your specific questions: 1) The only way to evaluate the cybersecurity of a system is through penetration testing. We’ve had several highly competent teams evaluate our technology and have failed to defeat it in any way. You should have your own penetration test teams test all of your systems before you put them into production, and then periodically continue to test them for vulnerabilities. That said, no system is perfectly secure. But, we’ve been accepting systems with poor cybersecuity for quite a while, it’s time to raise the bar on what is acceptable cybersecurity.

Absolutely NOT. The other way to prove cybersecurity of a system is to prove it. For example, I can write functions in Erlang that I can prove are mathematically correct. I can show any input and its related output. I can probe the state of the system and inspect it at any time. And I can functionally understand it from a formal aspect.

Your claim is "Oh just pentest it". That's what you have to do for a black box, but that only _delays_ major problems. For example, there's controllers on Hard Drives. Only the HD makers know about them, so nobody can do anything, right? Wrong. Enter Sprite_TM http://hackaday.com/2013/08/02/sprite_tm-ohm2013-talk-hackin...

This person figured out how to control all 3 ARM chips, with unknown instruction sets, from just probing, hacking binaries, and poking at stuff. Black boxes like what you're peddling WILL get hacked. And if they're white hats, they will likely tell you. Or, exploits will end up on random Tor auction site.

The middle ground is a published protocol and reference code to bootstrap. It doesn't have to be feature-laden. But its the foundation of proper Networking code. And instead, hand-waviness is claiming "We hired some hackers, so we're good". That doesn't cut it, especially for critical infrastructure.

_________________________________

> 2) You are free to choose open source or any product. The problem with current technologies is that they were designed before the kind of high-level cybersecurity we expect today was understood. These existing technologies are wed to their current protocols which can’t be patched to make them more secure. Only a redesign from scratch will do that, which is tantamount to abandoning their current protocols.

https://xkcd.com/927/

Oh, also, MQTT specifies absolutely nothing about payload type. Technically, a publish to a MQTT broker can be a cryptographic payload, a DVD image, a boolean, or anything. The spec allows anything to be put in as a publish. From there, it would be trivial to extend MQTT to require a cryptographic signature. Mosquitto supports plugins that could verify data authenticity.

And there's also RabbitMQ (AMQP) with forward-and-store. Similar extensions to it are available as plugins. What I see here, is a strawman of "Something something security" and pushing an untested, unfounded, unknown protocol for IoT and industrial devices, and operating on the "Hope and Prayer" principle.

_________________________________

> In a sense, cybersecurity is a conspiracy of trust. Without trust there is no security.

I disagree with this as well. I shouldn't have to "Trust". That's what "Proof" is about. Proof would allow me to accept the code, even if you are a bad actor (I don't believe you are, I only think your goals are misguided). If the foundations are solid, it wouldn't matter what you say, if anything.

[dwviel]

You bring up many valid points.

I won’t say much about crypto at this point other than we plan on having FIPS-140-2 certified crypto in the near future.

Yes, we are using a new protocol, but I don’t agree that it needs to be a full IETF standard. We are working within the standard IP 99 protocol. A protocol is just another piece of code, just like any other part of a systems code base. It just happens that this code talks to code on another machine. Should IETF or others review all code before using? Has all the code you use been so reviewed?

We don’t know if there is a protocol error in the definition of our stuff. If we did, we would fix it. What we did is a careful analysis and design of a highly constrained solution that was then carefully implemented and tested. That’s about as good as a human constructed machine can be built. If errors are found as the protocol is used, we will fix them, provided they are revealed to us. That’s the problem with cybersecurity, you never really know.

You need a peer review of a protocol. OK, but I ask again, does all your code need such a review before you will use it? Or are you singling out network protocols? BTW we are considering making this an open standard for the language and the wireline protocol, but we need to see how this plays out first.

Respectfully, I stand behind my statement that a system can’t be proven secure. I understand that there is a lot of good work going on in provably correct systems using formal methods. And I think that they will help greatly in making systems more correct, but they will never ultimately prove correctness in the mathematical sense. Take the Erlang code, how do you know it’s design is correct? That is, maybe it does exactly the wrong thing. Or that the code testing the Erlang code is correct?

Black box testing is the place to start. Then progressively lighting the testing, from gray to white box is usually recommended. Yes, testing is not perfect, but has defendable arguments about its correctness. Hence, the movement to use test-driven development.

Yes, there is a chance that our product will get hacked. But, that is not the issue. The issue is: will that take more effort, time, money, and resources to do than for what is being used today? We think the answer is yes.

Whether a protocol, or any code, is published or not, it is still vulnerable to being hacked and that hack being kept confidential. The effect is the same.

MQTT is a good example. The payload can be anything, including malware, as in the example where a client gets compromised. Our protocol is highly restricted so that secretly passing malware in a message is highly unlikely.

Again, respectfully, I stand by the statement that security is based on trust. Proof has to be believed to be useful, so you have to trust the source of the proof, and who provides it.

Overall, we believe that our product is simpler and less error prone to configure, and less vulnerable to exploits then assembling all the technologies that have been mentioned here. We are providing just one piece of a cybersecurity framework that only covers controls network communications, as part of an overall cybersecurity plan.

[kefka]

My comment was too long, as deemed by HN. So I posted it here.

https://pastebin.com/hLBbqk24

[dwviel]

Thanks for the detailed response.

I understand the need to see inside the technology to understand how and why it works. Some of our technology is being patented, so it will be published. Some is trade secrets, so we keep that closely held. These are business decisions that may change in the future as needed. We are considering publishing the protocol on the wire standard and the SIDL language, as so many people will likely want an open standard for these. We don’t believe in “security through obscurity” as that is just delaying the inevitable and fooling ones self. On the other hand, we do have some competitors that may like some of our closely held techniques, which we would rather not share.

The example of the motor controller is a good one, and one that this technology handles well. In the case of a command to set motor speed the interface message specifies the acceptable range of values and the implementation on each side enforces those limits. So, the motor won’t spin beyond its capabilities. These are just the kind of use cases for which the protocol was designed. With regards to RFCs, they are recommendations not specifications per se. That is, a vendor is free to implement the RFC as it sees fit. An offensive cyber operator told me that if you want to hack a network just open the RFCs and search for the word “may” and start there. So, what you get can be very vendor specific.

Our chief concern as to attackers is the nation-state actors. We believe that they have the best techniques and are at the leading edge of cyberoffense capabilities. Unfortunately, there work is highly classified and we only get a glimpse or an innuendo occasionally as to what they do.

One of the features of the technology that really enhances the defensive strength is the use of the highly constrained interface specification. If an attacker on a compromised client tried to shoehorn some malware into a message it would almost certainly get dropped as the bit combination in the message arguments would most likely not pass the constraint validation tests. Thus, the attack surface for the interface is greatly reduced from that allowed by other protocols.

We don’t trust SSL, SSH, and SCP, as we’ve been told not to. We only use these during configuration when we tell users to disconnect the system from the network.

I appreciate the thoughts. Makes me think hard about what we’re doing and how to communicate it.

What about the “flagged”?