| First. Strawman. Not helpful. I actually lifted the nomenclature directly from National Security experts. I did not invent or distort any of the nomenclature. Further, it is a very accurate representation of the terminology and nomenclature. The point I hope to drive home is that 70 years later the same "chilling" (title word, not mine) is in effect. > "competitor countries" in the nuclear context mean "countries that threaten us with nuclear war" No. If you look at the list of target nations they include non-nuclear countries (Syria, Iran, etc). > "coercive tactic" and "when it serves the US national interest" correspondingly means "threatening nuclear war to dissuade existential threats" Mostly wrong. An existential threat could be an economic or political existential threat, or it could be conventional. And it can also be used (IS used) for non-existential coercion: say defending an ally. > "competitive disadvantage" means "being on the losing side of a nuclear exchange". No. It means facing a large risk of losing in a conflict of some kind for which there is a large interest in the US of winning. This does not apply only to nuclear exchange and indeed National Security practitioners are quite keen to discuss "cross-domain" warfare (lawfare, sanctions, political entanglement, etc). > We can debate what the official policy should or should not say but please don't take the terms out of context to make them sound scary You've taken the terms out of context. I hope I didn't make them sound scary. I mean, reality is a bit scary some times but I wrote that as quite matter-of-fact. |
You're using present tense with incredibly broad terminology, same for the rest of your post. It's so broad that it's either meaningless or you really think we're currently, actively holding a nuclear gun to everyone's head over every little thing.
If so it doesn't seem to be getting us very far. China should be far more compliant. /s
Now that you've clarified, you're clearly speculating about what the US "might" or "could" do given the current official policy that's on the books. Which is fine, but it's almost purely speculative and counters your previous point.
Do you have any historical examples of the US actively strong-armining an opponent with the threat of a first strike over a political existential threat? How about an economic existential threat? How about cross-domain warfare with the threat of a nuclear first strike? I have no doubt the plans were drawn up by some department of the government, particularly during the early Cold War. But to my knowledge they have never even come close to mplementation outside of the Korean War and Cuban Missile Crisis.
As for conventional existential threats, Syria and Iran, I would hope that if someone managed to mount a conventional D-Day style invasion of the coasts we would nuke them. And I don't see Syria and Iran anywhere on the list (not that I have time for an exhaustive search, page number?), but it makes sense that Syria and Iran be included given prevailing attitudes about Soviet influence in the 1950s. A nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union would have been total war, including those perceived, rightly or wrongfully, to be their client states.