> You attempted to reach llvm.org, but the server presented a certificate signed using a weak signature algorithm (such as SHA-1). This means that the security credentials the server presented could have been forged, and the server may not be the server you expected (you may be communicating with an attacker).
I don't really know, but I would be suprised if that is the intent of the project because:
1. The maintainer of llgo is a Google employee (and a very talented LLVM engineer).
2. I don't imagine there would be tremendous differences in the strategies used to generate LLVM IR between the tools. ISTM, if there are deficiencies in llgo, then it would be better to fix them rather than creating a whole new tool.
If you take advantage of the two-hour edit window and remove the spaces in front of 1 and 2, it will be easier to read, especially on mobile:
1. The maintainer of llgo is a Google employee (and a very talented LLVM engineer).
2. I don't imagine there would be tremendous differences in the strategies used to generate LLVM IR between the tools. ISTM, if there are deficiencies in llgo, then it would be better to fix them rather than creating a whole new tool.
> You attempted to reach llvm.org, but the server presented a certificate signed using a weak signature algorithm (such as SHA-1). This means that the security credentials the server presented could have been forged, and the server may not be the server you expected (you may be communicating with an attacker).