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by adrianratnapala
3321 days ago
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Ok, I think I accept your point about distinguishing a symmetrical concept of "change" applied to asymmetrical things from a truly asymmetrical concept of change. That clarifies what I was getting at in my last paragraph. But I am still surprised to see it as a characterisation of the A vs. B debate[1] So please help me check I am understanding the terms of that debate correctly. (1) Even if it is not the way you explain it to students, do you accept my claim that A-theory considers time and change as being more fundamental than physics? (2) If I further said "... as opposed to considering time change to be properties of the history of the universe", then would you accept the implied dichotomy? [1] And I say the A-B is in turn not truly a debate reality of time, which was just an unfortunate framing by McTaggart. |
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That's likely still unclear, but that's to be expected. We typically can't ask questions about fundamental structure without invoking that fundamental structure itself. That's why I find the analogy to left/right so helpful. We have a pretty good idea of what it means for left/right orientation not to be built into the fundamental structure of nature. And so that can provide a way of testing various claims about the fundamentality of asymmetrical temporal ordering.
2. I'm not sure I have a grip on what this additional thing is supposed to add. But I'll note that you reference 'history' and one might reasonably think that that is a temporal notion. If you meant 'history' to mean something like "the universe's extension in the temporal direction", that doesn't quite seem to allow for the distinction I took you to be trying to make.
(And, yes, McTaggert's framing is highly unhelpful.)