[treytrey]

I'm not sure this thought makes sense, but just putting it out there for rebuttals and to understand what is really possible:

I assume IPFS networks can be disrupted by a state actor and only thing that a state actor like the US may have some trouble with is strong encryption. I assume it's also possible that quantum computers, if and when they materialize at scale, would defeat classical encryption.

So my point in putting forward these unverified assumptions is to question whether ANY technology can stand in the way of a determined, major-world-power-type state actor. Personally, I have no reason to believe that's realistic, and all these technologies are toys relative to the billions of dollars in funding that the spy agencies receive.

[lgierth]

One important anti-censorship measure employed by IPFS is that it doesn't have to rely on the Internet backbone to exchange data. Well, it's not so much an active measure, it's part of the core design.

You can be in the same room with no internet connection whatsoever and still exchange data.

Network transports get added kinda regularly, so far there's TCP, UTP, Websockets, WebRTC, and a couple of work-in-progress transports: Onion, QUIC, FlyWeb

[placeybordeaux]

> I assume it's also possible that quantum computers, if and when they materialize at scale, would defeat classical encryption.

Only some existing systems are known to be broken under quantum computing. Then it comes down to the implementation details.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Post-quantum_cryptography

[weberc2]

Probably not, but why make it cheap and easy to do so? Also, there are other bad actors with fewer resources and less-determination than a nation-state.

[Normal_gaussian]

It does force the actor to openly be blocking it, which is better than not knowing in that you now have the potential to effect real change.

[hobofan]

Even if openly blocked, the P2P nature allows you to go around any government-controlled devices, given that the network is strong enough.