[besselheim]

The distinction does make sense though. If an intercept is taken, never looked at, and eventually deleted, then from a 'privacy violation' point of view it may as well not have been collected at all.

But these still need to be intercepted in the first place, because you don't know in advance which of the 0.01% of records are of interest.

[colemannugent]

From a privacy standpoint, the fact that they make a copy of your data is alarming, as this multiplies the attack surface for your data.

Also, all the data is "looked at". Sure, not by a human, but if the algorithmn can flag you as a terrorist and then humans look through the data, what's the difference.

You also seem to be under the impression that they delete the data once they're done. But why would they ever delete that copy of your data unless they need the space for something else? They never will, and that's why they're building a huge datacenter in Utah, to store EVERYTHING INDEFINITELY.

As to your last point, I'll flip the table: if only 0.01% of the records are interesting and only 0.01% of those records lead to any meaningful insight into terrorist activities, why should we continue these programs knowing that they are, on average, 99.999% ineffective?

[DanielBMarkham]

"...But these still need to be intercepted in the first place, because you don't know in advance which of the 0.01% of records are of interest...."

They do not, and the reason why is interesting.

In free countries, there is an order to things. This order is important.

First there is an event. A person applies for security clearance, there's a robbery, somebody reports a crime, and so on.

Second there is an investigation. Based on the nature of the event reported, facts are gathered to determine whether or not the state needs to intervene. More importantly, the people are identified that need intervention. Based on the investigation, sometimes the state might intervene with force, as in when a SWAT team shows up at your door.

The order is clear, and necessary. Event > data gathering > investigation > people. We start with an event and end up with people who might be criminals. That's because everybody is guilty of something. It's important to limit the state to only go after people where there is a clear, independent prompt for something to happen, ie, an event.

But what if we change it around? What if we collect data all the time? Well then we are no longer limited to having a good and independent reason for taking action. Instead, now we can start with the person and then figure out what they're guilty of until it justifies the action we've already selected. And guess what? Everybody is guilty of something.

All we've done is create a machine where we can identify people we don't like, push a button, and then find reasons to put them in jail or apply force to them in other ways. Free countries cannot continue operating in an environment like that. Because we've made the law do our bidding, there is effectively no rule of law. And people are smart enough to figure that out.

[TallGuyShort]

If you can go ahead and mail me a duplicate of your debit card, I'd like to intercept it. I promise not to collect it.

The fact that the infrastructure is in place and rampant abuse has happened in the past make the distinction essentially meaningless.

If someone is going to justify interception they need to justify collection, because we all know it's going to happen unjustly to at least some citizens.