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by samaparicio 3342 days ago
A lot of startups get sued by Non Practicing Entities (trolls) that have no operating business to speak of. That provides the slimmest counterattack surface - so not sure how useful it is to have a portfolio to hit back.

I think a better defense mechanism would be a legal defense fund that would force the trolls to make their case at trial, to go through discovery, to bring expert witnesses.

Because the law firms that represent them work on contingency, this would effectively cut into the potential licensing fees, and make trolling less profitable (and less likely).

Also, a lot of trolls extract patent licensing fees out of startups for patents that should have never been granted, and that deserve to be invalidated (e.g with prior art), but the process of getting a patent thrown out is expensive, so having a fund would greatly help.

The other strategy that could work is to get all the startups that get sued by a troll for a specific infringement and make a sort of "reverse class action" - making it possible for the startups to re-use the same lines of argument, evidence, etc in their cases.

4 comments

Others have mentioned this, but this PatentSheield scheme is not useful against non-practicing entities (NPEs or "trolls). It is intended to be used by startups who are at risk of sued by big incumbants. For example, if an IoT startup participates in this program and is sued by an established IoT company, the startup can take title to the portfolio and counter-sue the incumbant for infringement of the portfolio patents. At that point, the companies agree to a cross-licensing deal and both parties live to fight another day.

This kind of arrangement is not useful for countering NPEs because NPEs are non-practicing by definition. Since they are non-practicing, you can't countersue for infringement.

Your note about cooperation between potential defendants is spot-on. The difficulty is in getting them to cooperate. Accused infringers are likely to be competitors who may not be inclined to cooperate. Further, it is to the advantage of each to simply license the patent and wait for another accused infringer to do the work to invalidate the patent, at which point they can all stop paying license fees. (A classic "free rider" problem.)

By the way, a company can buy patent infringement insurance that will pay for litigation or settlement costs, but it isn't clear that it is worth the premium.

Let's say I pay into this fund, then I get sued for patent infringement. How does the fund decide whether this lawsuit is trolling or legitimate? Or would the fund pay for all patent lawsuits?
There are several ways of reaching a distributed consensus about that, like proof of stake.

It is also conceivable that it would be in the fund's interest to defend all lawsuits. That would provide the largest deterrent, since the lion's share of today's suits are without merit, and the cost of defense would be considered the operating cost of the fund.

What the trolls exploit is the assymetry between a defendant without resources and their own resources which are solely dedicated to this.

Without all the licensing fees that startups pay to settle the alleged infringement the business model for trolls would stop working.

That would provide the largest deterrent, since the lion's share of today's suits are without merit

Doesn't this depend on what "without merit" means? It seems unlikely they are "without merit" in the legal sense, since then they would be thrown out at the first hearing.

If you mean they are from patent trolls aka non-practicing entities, then it seems wrong too. I see coverage of tens of cases by NPEs per year, but the entire patent law-suite field must be much bigger than that.

There are probably better sources than this PWC report[1], but it identifies 477 out of 2281 (ie, 21%) cases since 1996 in the districts where NPEs file cases involving NPEs. Their definition of NPE includes universities though, which I don't think is what people generally think of when they think of "patent trolls".

If "without merit" means that they almost always lose, then this doesn't seem right either. The success rate for patent cases varies, but seems around 25-35%. That's far from "lion's share without merit"

[1] https://www.pwc.com/us/en/forensic-services/publications/ass...

Ars Technica reported last year that in 2015 over two thirds of patent lawsuits were filed by trolls and that of all patent lawsuits, 44% were filed in the Eastern District of Texas (where few others than trolls would be filing suits). The report says that although the numbers are up, the trolls' business might be down.

Ars: https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2016/01/despite-law-chan...

Original statistic: https://www.unifiedpatents.com/news/2016/5/30/2015-patent-di...

This is strange.

The total number of cases seems to line up between the two reports (5700 in 2015, not including PTAB).

But only 2281 cases involving NPEs were decided between 1996 and 2015[1]. If 66% are filed by NPEs, then this should be much more. Unless the vast majority are dropped I guess?

[1] https://www.pwc.com/us/en/forensic-services/publications/ass..., page 16

Yes. Cases issued will not correspond to cases decided, since many cases settle. And there is a long time-lag from starting a case to ending it with a judgment.
I guess a lot of cases involve settling before getting to court maybe?
> It seems unlikely they are "without merit" in the legal sense, since then they would be thrown out at the first hearing.

In all patent troll cases I've seen, a patent exists, and the defendant is actually infringing the patent. So there is some merit to the lawsuit.

The problem is that the "inventions" in the patents:

* are not novel, or

* are not non-obvious, or

* have not been described in sufficient detail to replicate without further research, or

* a combination of all of the above for various claims in the patent.

so the patent should never have been issued in the first place. But invalidating the patent in court is a tedious and expensive process. You need many expert witnesses debating what is novel, what is non-obvious, and what is sufficiently detailed, it's not something a judge can decide in 10 minutes.

Couldn't the fund just use arms-length consulting patent attorneys to answer the question: does defending this case have a reasonable prospect of success?
It could. It could also force the startup to hand over control of the defense (which the startup would most likely be ill-suited to control) and therefore control the defense strategy.

All that is required is a big enough defense fund that acts as a true deterrent.

Mind you, if the startup loses it doesn't mean that it would not be responsible for the payout - but at least the startup wouldn't fold simply because the costs of defending itself are out of reach.

Yeah, but then you don't make money by investing in the next big company.
This. It would also get the troll patents invalidated.