|
|
|
|
|
by derefr
3347 days ago
|
|
> did all the 8+ MB worth of it pop out of our head all at once? or more realistically, did we develop the features piece by piece, not unlike how upstream linux is developed? That's not an argument against the current state of the pax/grsec being much more monolithic in architecture than the Linux kernel (I don't know if it is; just that that argument doesn't prove it's not.) Sure, the commits are small. 1000 small commits can add up to 100 small+simple components, or to 10 rather large+complex ones. > define invasive "Invasive", I believe, refers to how much of the kernel needs to be modified to upstream any given feature (regardless of patch size.) The opposite of "invasive" is "isolated". 1000 lines of code in one module representing a new USB device driver, for example, is very non-invasive. It doesn't even need to be "hooked into" anything; it just puts a vendor+device ID into a database, and some existing logic will then detect devices with such IDs showing up on the bus and load the module in response. Meanwhile, 1000 lines of code that make breaking changes (however small) in the ABIs or preconditions/postconditions of 100 different existing kernel functions, is an "invasive" patch. It requires a lot more testing than the USB driver to be accepted, because those 100 existing functions will be executed by a lot more people's machines than the USB-device module (which will only get executed on machines that have that device.) |
|
> The problem is that getting things into small individually testable components > is literally anathema to the Pax/grsecurity model.
nowhere does this talk about what the patch looks like. it talks about "getting things into small individually testable components" being "literally anathema to the Pax/grsecurity model". i.e., that decomposing the monolithic patch into composable pieces is somehow against our development model whereas said monolithic patch was developed exactly this way (which means the reverse process would reproduce these 'testable components'). that argument (my statement) directly contradicts Jeff's so only one of them can be true and as the author of the code in question i know which one is what ;).
as for invasiveness, you're only stating the obvious that there're more and less complex pieces of code yet both kinds (well, all kinds in the complexity spectrum really) can make it into the kernel. that is, this argument cannot be used against incorporating grsec on its own.