[DougN7]

> To put it generally, if you believe in claim X for bad reasons, and it later is discovered that X is true, it does not mean that you were retroactively acting rational for previously believing in claim X for bad reasons.

That is true. Isn't it equally as true that if one goes around telling people they are wrong, and then it turns out that one is wrong (based on new evidence), one has been wrong AND a hypocrite? The temptation is to say "ahh, but THIS TIME we have better science!". That's always been the case.

My point isn't about truth and error as much as hubris, humility, and respect.

[sofal]

I think a big part of the reason why hubris is bad is because it causes you to make mistakes when determining truth from error. If someone goes around telling people a claim is false without sufficient justification, and they're doing so as a reaction against people believing in the claim for bad reasons, then you could say that their hubris (or something like it) caused them to make an error in judgement.

There is a difference between saying that a belief in a claim is not rationally justified and saying that a claim is false. Both sides of these debates can make mistakes. Those against believing in the claim can make the counterclaim that it is false, and they might not actually have justification for that. On the other hand, often those that believe in the claim misinterpret the other side as making the counterclaim when they are in fact not doing so.

In the case of autism there has been extensive research since the moral panic began, and no evidence for a link has been found where it was expected to be found, thereby bringing increased justification for the counterclaim. I think this is also true with many other unsupported claims out there that are popular enough to have been exposed to systematic scrutiny.