[greenshackle2]

> it's fine to not care for insects

Well no it's not exactly 'fine'. Maybe we will figure out some day that insects are a little bit conscious and it may turn out we have collectively been literally worse than Hitler for not caring.

In the meantime I choose not to care, not as a fully logical decision, but for my own sanity and well-being. I'm a dumb ape who tries (and even maybe succeeds) to be logical sometimes, my moral 'system' is a hodge-podge of intuition, rule-based and consequentialist thinking, I don't claim I have found a fully logical moral system.

> it's fine to not care for insects because there are a lot of them, and because their lives are short and brutal.

No no no, I'm saying, if you care at all, you should care about all of them, because as a rule their lives are short and brutal.

It's not like with humans where a lot of us have ok lives, so you can focus on the ones that have a bad time. Pretty much all insects have a bad time (if they are 'having a time' at all, i.e. if they are conscious).

I'm saying I reject caring about any one insect because it very probably leads to a repugnant conclusion (that I should care about insects above all else), based on utilitarian math -- unless you choose very very carefully how much you care about each insect.

I understand most people only care about local things. I think that's a moral failing, ideally I want to care just as much about people far away than about local people. I don't in practice but I try (I do donate to charities that help people in poor countries far from home.)

If I follow that logic and extend my caring to insects, I should care about all insects.

> I think you're making the argument "either you HAVE to care about every fly or you CANNOT care about any flies." Perhaps that logic works for you, but I think it's a fallacy

That's not my argument, that's my conclusion, based on utilitarian math, and I'm making a probabilistic argument, not a deductive logic argument, so calling it a fallacy is a type error on two counts.

> I also adhere to non-interference. If a fly is caught in a spider web, I will leave it.

What's the logic behind that? If a child stumbles into a pond and drowns, or is mauled by a wild coyote, will you let them die on the basis of non-interference?

[orthecreedence]

> What's the logic behind that distinction? If a child stumbles into a pond and drown, or is mauled by a wild coyote, will you let them die on the basis of non-interference?

Great point, you got me there. All life forms being equal, then yes if I adhered to my own system I suppose I would have to silently watch a child get mauled by a coyote. Obviously, I wouldn't take it that far, so perhaps there's more criteria to the decisions than I'm admitting or able to even dig out of my psyche at the moment. I'll think about this.

Your other points about utilitarian math are well-taken, and perhaps I misunderstood you there.

> If I follow that logic and extend my caring to insects, I should care about all insects.

So if you care about starving children, and apply the same rules you apply to children to insects, you'd be donating a lot to charity, basically. Makes sense =]. So once again, my live-and-let-die attitude towards insects is at odds with my "help unfortunate members of humanity" "morality." Another good point (granted, I don't donate much to charity, but if I did, I would probably donate to poor/starving people as opposed to insect charities).

> I'm a dumb ape who tries (and even maybe succeeds) to be logical sometimes, my moral 'system' is a hodge-podge of intuition, rule-based and consequentialist thinking, I don't claim I have found a fully logical moral system.

This is probably the most coherent, self-aware moral system I've heard. Most people try to ascribe their beliefs to some overarching theme that they pretend to follow in all circumstances, when in reality most of our actions are governed by a tiny fraction of what we believe to be morality, and the rest is knee-jerk reactions to situations that affect us emotionally one way or the other. Not only that, but our beliefs (as you pointed out in my case), are a "hodge-podge" of rules, emotions, and hardwiring.

All that said, I still try to be nice to all animals, and will continue to do so until I find the next mishmash set of rules to figure out why I believe what I believe.

EDIT: relevant: http://wondermark.com/c/2015-06-25-1135earn.png

[greenshackle2]

> So if you care about starving children, and apply the same rules you apply to children to insects, you'd be donating a lot to charity, basically.

To insect charity yeah. Or spending a lot of time doing insect advocacy or something.

Instead I donate for anti-malaria bed nets for kids and argue about animal ethics on the internet.

> if I adhered to my own system I suppose I would have to silently watch a child get mauled by a coyote

Right. Obviously no one but psychopaths act like that. I think what you call 'non-interference' ties in with the difference between the moral weight of action vs inaction. Most people's moral intuition draw a distinction between the two, and think action matters more. The interesting thing is that you can construct scenarios where that intuition changes.

Don't know if that comic was aimed at me I can sympathize with black hat guy though I know he's supposed to be the annoying dick in the comic.

I think it's interesting to take propositions to their logical extremes, but you have to hedge the results with common sense because when you take things to their extremes a small error in reasoning could lead you far astray.

[henrikschroder]

I enjoyed this conversation chain a lot!

> I think it's interesting to take propositions to their logical extremes

What I find most annoying about animal rights activists is that they mean well, but most of them haven't really thought through their position, and pushing their positions to logical extremes is a great way of exposing it. People actually value human life above other life, and those that claim otherwise are either liars, psychopaths, or they just haven't thought it through.

I mean, if you make a classical trolley problem where you have to choose between saving 1 human baby or N puppies, is there a number, N, such that you would save the puppies instead of the baby? The logical consequence of "all life is equal" is that N=2. That's clearly murderous. If you were to make lifespan a factor, and dogs live 1/7th of a human, then N=8. That's still highly objectionable.

I honestly don't know if there's a number where I would start choosing the puppies.. 1 million? Puppycide or one human? Or is that example too extreme? I don't know, but it's interesting to think about.