[RexetBlell]

I would argue that today ironically the chance of Ethereum forking again due to a poorly written contract is much lower than it was a year ago. Many lessons were learned and the community is much larger. Also many people who supported the Dao fork, would be against the fork today, because there is no more excuse that "we are early and we don't know how to write secure contract code".

[adamrezich]

The recursion thing was an interesting loophole, and we now know to avoid it when writing contracts. What if there is another interesting loophole that we haven't yet discovered, and that gets exploited? You say,

>Also many people who supported the Dao fork, would be against the fork today, because there is no more excuse that "we are early and we don't know how to write secure contract code".

but what you really mean is, we've identified a single "attack vector" and now know to avoid it. And, in the process, we've set a precedent that the discovery of any sufficiently large-scale-affecting (or core developer-affecting?) "attack vector" can potentially result in the software contracts being overridden by human action, i.e. a rollback and hard fork. Thus, I personally see no reason to trust the Ethereum network, even though it's full of really cool ideas and technology.

[DennisP]

Fwiw there was no rollback. The fork moved the stolen funds, but didn't affect unrelated transactions.