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by kuizu 3360 days ago
Public information is very thin on the exploitability of this. Are you able to elaborate a little bit where MSG_PEEK might be used? Is it used in the kernel? Only in specific applications?
2 comments

Reading the original link, it looks like the kernel corruption only happens when an user space application uses the recvfrom() syscall using the MSG_PEEK option. MSG_PEEK is only used AFAIK only in specific applications that need to "peek" at the message without consuming it. This is not a very common use case, but some research should be done to understand if there is some popular application using it.
If I've understood this correctly, it turns it into a local privilege escalation opportunity: run a vulnerable application as the user, use the exploit to get code execution in the kernel.
Yes that's my understanding as well, user space code using a given syscall with given parameters triggers the kernel exploit.
Yeah, but there is still a little bit of explicit usage of recvfrom() with MSG_PEEK

https://codesearch.debian.net/search?q=recvfrom+.*+MSG_PEEK

And probably more implicit

https://codesearch.debian.net/search?q=recv+.*+MSG_PEEK

The use in wget seems a little scary.
I believe you've misread the article, first line:

> udp.c in the Linux kernel before 4.5 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via UDP traffic....

> MSG_PEEK is only used AFAIK only in specific applications that need to "peek" at the message without consuming it

I never used the MSG_PEEK flag, but over 15 years ago (maybe it wasnt implemented yet?) I accomplished a similar task by using the SO_REUSEADDR and SO_REUSEPORT flags which worked nicely on Windows too. The goal was to have several UDP "agents" listening on the same port on the same machine (which would normally raise an EADDRINUSE error), all of them examining a packet and acting upon a header contained in that packet. All them would receive a copy of the packet on their respective socket (that was the flags purpose), so that they could filter it and act only if the header contained data relative to that agent. This allowed a very modular approach where once the protocol was defined I could compile only the agent I needed without touching the others.

This is a flag that the application has to explicitly set when receiving data. Looks like this flag has limited usage based on the description. I've checked with the strace tool few programs that use UDP on my Linux boxes: unbound resolver, ntpd, openvpn. None seems to use it.

MSG_PEEK This flag causes the receive operation to return data from the beginning of the receive queue without removing that data from the queue. Thus, a subsequent receive call will return the same data.

I've managed to find one case, the net-snmp package uses MSG_PEEK in the SMUX subagent system, heaven knows why. But since the smux socket is practically always bound to localhost, that is not a problem.

As far as I can tell, a packet from a non-localhost source may be received, but (obviously) the udp_recvmsg does not get called since the system call is not triggered.

Unfortunately, there is a large amount of devices such as home routers, televisions, phones, etc, that are completely impossible to update. So, being aware of cases of software that actually use MSG_PEEK might be useful.