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by mtrpcic
3358 days ago
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Isn't the attack surface limited to the methods used in the application though? Even if libsodium has a vulnerability in some ABC method, unless the application in question uses that code path, it's not an immediate risk (Obviously it should get patched and stable, secure software is preferred over the alternative). I'm just trying to understand how the "attack surface" is calculated, and how a potential vuln in an unused method is a huge risk. |
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No, because the combination of how you put them together can make you vulnerable.
For example, if you are encrypting lots of messages that all have the same header, certain crypto algorithms can be made to leak the key.
Do you know which combinations those are? I sure don't by default.
The fact that an end programmer even has to think about this is the problem.
In any cryptosystem, the application programmer is the person who knows the least about crypto. If he has to make any decision, you can expect he will get it wrong.