[remarkEon]

Gonna throw some nuance out there on this.

I think it's much more complicated than resisting expansion of the Armed Forces. The last ~16 years of war has fundamentally changed the way the military operates, both in terms of how we build our strategies and how we operationally conduct these wars. Instead of a full-force commitment (units deploy and don't come home until the job is done), we've instead fought this thing in spastic increments, with a kind of warped "turn-based" leadership model ("Whose turn is it to be a Combatant Commander?"). This is why from the invasion through 2014 we had 16 different ISAF commanders. No wonder we've struggled to develop a coherent strategy.

I point that out because I agree that we need to back off from pointless Middle East entanglements immediately, because the Long War has altered how we (I mean soldiers and their leaders, both GOs and Civilians) view preparation for war. There is no way the model used in Afghanistan and Iraq (I understand the difference between the two, I'm talking about sustainment differences here), full of mega-FOBs for the sustainers and (mostly) consistent resupply for the war-fighters, is something we should be expecting in the future - be it a conflict with Russia, China, those pesky Donovians.

There's reasons to be optimistic, and Mattis is one of them. General Milley also seems to "get it", that we've gotten pretty lost in our understanding of what "readiness" and "sustainment" really means.[1]

Disclaimer: Former Infantry Officer, though I do spend a lot of time thinking and writing with friends both in and out about this stuff.

[1]http://breakingdefense.com/2016/10/miserable-disobedient-vic...

[Jtsummers]

Part of that deployment strategy shift began in the 90s during operations Northern and Southern Watch. Along with a set of shorter conflicts (with NATO and others) under Clinton. There was a political need/desire to shift the way we acted, and it persisted even during the '00s and '10s period of sustained, long-term military conflict.

EDIT: My experience was with the USAF side, other forces still had longer deployment periods at that time, and it wasn't uniform across USAF.

[remarkEon]

Yes that's totally true, though I'll submit that the "deployment cycle" mindset was certainly solidified in the last decade as "the way we do things" - at least on my side in the Army (Obviously I don't speak for everyone, and I know I'm not the only one who had problems with the "cycle" mindset). The politics are also a reason we moved toward that strategy. I just don't think it's a wise one. It probably wasn't wise back then, and I definitely don't think it's wise for the future.

Edit: One of the stories (Myths?) you hear about McChrystal is that he'd ask Company Commanders downrange this question: "What would you do different if you couldn't come home until we'd won?" Granted, that presupposes we actually had a true picture of what it would look like when we'd "won" but it shows how easy it can be to become...disconnected when you know that you're outta there before next fighting season.