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The following two sentences, from the second page of the paper, are where he really nails it: "We may call this the subjective character of experience. It is not captured by any of the familiar, recently devised reductive analyses of the mental, for all of them are logically compatible with its absence." All of today's science is logically compatible with the absence of subjective experience, because science cannot even define what subjective experience is. Every "definition" of subjective experience (SE, in what follows), is actually an ostension: the reader's attention is directed to his own SE. For example: - Perhaps nothing actually exists -- except SE. That's the one thing that MUST exist. [Descartes]
- "There is such a thing, as what it's like to be..." [Nagel, in the posted paper]
- There's such a thing, as what seeing red is like: a quale.
- Science can't rule out that a behaviorally perfect duplicate of you, could lack SE (i.e. be a zombie).
Science can't rule it out, but maybe SE does: why would a zombie vociferously assert the existence of SE?
Those who claim SE is an illusion, i.e. that you actually are a zombie but don't know it,
have the burden of explaining why zombies claim to have SE.
All of these "definitions" require an audience that has SE and is able to recognize it. A scientific definition would not. |
Not entirely true. Science is made up of language (syntax, meaning etc) and is also observer-relative.